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1 INTRODUCTION 
The Paul Simon Public Policy Institute at Southern Illinois University Carbondale conducts 
periodic statewide polls on a wide variety of important governmental, political, and public policy 
issues relevant to state and federal government agendas. These polls provide a detailed 
description and analysis of the issues that inform the public dialog from an academic and non-
partisan perspective. The polls have come to be widely quoted and deeply trusted by public 
officials, opinion leaders, the media and the general public over the twelve years they have been 
in existence, and they have made valuable contributions to basic research being conducted by 
both faculty and students at SIU and other institutions.   
Each poll is somewhat different in the specific issues and personalities covered, since the 
polls are geared toward current public opinion on relevant issues, and space is included on each 
poll for questions that support the specific academic objectives of faculty and student 
researchers.  Every poll also includes a core group of repeated questions that reflect the constant 
and ongoing concerns of the people of Illinois and the research agenda of the Institute.  This core 
group of questions provides an invaluable and unprecedented set of results -- a series of 
snapshots of public opinion in Illinois over time.  These longitudinal data points combine to give 
us a reliable time series tracing both continuity and change in public opinion in Illinois. 
The current paper reports on the results of fifteen statewide polls conducted between 
2008 and 20191. Most of the polls sampled 1,000 respondents across Illinois; a sample that size 
has a margin of error of plus or minus 3.1 percent. A few of the earlier polls had smaller samples 
with larger margins of error (see Appendix A).  To our knowledge, our archive is unmatched in 
Illinois in terms of both their depth and the provision of a time series although there several 
similar and well regarded statewide polls located in universities in other states (Parry, Kisida, 
and Langley, 2008).   
The current report is an extension of the longitudinal data report we provided in an earlier 
Simon Review based on the 2008 through 2016 polls (Jackson, Leonard, and Deitz, 2016). In 
major respects the current report is a revision and update to that original paper, continuing and 
revising our analysis of the political narrative and history in Illinois.  That paper was subtitled: 
The Roots of Gridlock. The 2016 paper reflected the deep polarization and gridlock that had 
made Illinois a dysfunctional state at that point in its history. The current report extends the 
analysis by an additional three years, and posits a new and possibly more hopeful direction with 
the subtitle Gridlock Broken? We tentatively offer this conclusion as we trace the opportunities 
and peril facing Illinois at this crucial time in the state’s long, colorful, and sometimes checkered 
two hundred year history.   
  
                                                                    
1 Most of the polls have been conducted in the spring; if there is a second poll, it was done in the fall.  
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2 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT  
When we started The Simon Poll in the spring of 2008, Rod Blagojevich was governor, having 
been elected to his second term over Judy Barr Topinka in 2006 by a margin of 50 percent to 39 
percent.  Blagojevich did not know it then, but his term was about to be foreshortened abruptly 
on December 9, 2008 when he was arrested by federal agents in the early hours of the morning at 
his home in Chicago and charged with a series of federal crimes.  His fellow Democrats in the 
General Assembly led the charge, and he was swiftly removed from office the next month 
(Sierachi, 2009).   
Pat Quinn, a veteran of many previous elections and holder of a variety of lower public 
offices, was Blagojevich’s Lieutenant Governor.  As the Illinois Constitution provided, Quinn 
was promoted to the governor’s office, a position he had long wanted, but which many observers 
would not have expected him to obtain. Quinn had always fashioned himself to be the 
consummate outsider, riding the populist wave for one cause or another.  Yet, due to unforeseen 
events, he became governor and took charge of the executive branch. At the beginning of his 
term, he received credit for providing welcome stability in the wake of the dislocations and 
threatened chaos created by the haphazard way Blagojevich had tried to govern, exacerbated by 
the impeachment and removal of a sitting governor. 
Quinn accomplished several important things in 2009 and 2010 with the cooperation and 
assistance of most of his fellow Democrats in the General Assembly -- many of whom he had 
often feuded with and criticized in the past.  In particular, the Democrats coalesced and even 
gained some Republican support on a large $31 billion capital (or infrastructure) bill dubbed 
“Illinois Jobs Now,” enacted in 2009.  It was funded by revenue from a new video gambling tax 
plus online lottery profits, additional sales taxes on candy and alcohol, and an increase to vehicle 
licenses fees.  This was the first capital bill that Illinois had passed since George Ryan’s $12 
billion “Illinois FIRST” plan, approved in 1999 (Pearson and Petrella, April 28, 2019).  
 Legislators and governors alike often favor capital bills because the new construction or 
repair money allows them to attend ribbon-cuttings on big and important projects -- exciting 
work that is widely supported in communities across the state. While new capital plans are 
usually popular at the grassroots and in the General Assembly, they always face the problem of 
finding a funding mechanism that will support a dedicated revenue stream. While no legislator 
will miss a ceremonial ribbon-cutting for a new highway or building project, ordinarily very few 
seem to want to show up and vote for a tax increase.    
Thus, the question of where new revenue is to be found is always on the table for new 
capital bills or for dealing with the state’s perennial general fund and pension system needs. This 
problem is especially compelling in Illinois since the state consistently has run a structural deficit 
in its budget. A “structural deficit” simply means that the state’s rate of spending on public 
goods and services grows faster than its revenue growth.   
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This problem has been persistent and evident in Illinois at least since the start of the 
Blagojevich Administration, although this structural deficit had roots back to the administrations 
of his three Republican predecessors, James Thompson, Jim Edgar and George Ryan.   Two of 
the state’s leading experts on Illinois budgeting, James D. Nowlan and J. Thomas Johnson, in 
their book, Fixing Illinois published in 2014 summarized the accumulated impact of the 
perennial structural deficit: “… between 2002 and 2011…State of Illinois net assets declined 
from -$5.7 billion to -$42.5 billion, or about $4 billion per year, primarily because of spending 
and obligating more than the state was receiving in revenues. And during this period, the state 
also either borrowed to make annual pension payments or failed to make adequate payments” 
(Nowlan and Johnson, 2014, 25).  The primary growth in the state budget and drivers of the 
annual deficit has come from increases in the state’s spending on Medicaid, pensions and 
corrections (Nowlan, 2019, 6-7).  
Upon Pat Quinn’s election in his own right to the governor’s chair in November of 2010, 
he decided to make a frontal attack on the Illinois deficit. Quinn and his fellow Democrats 
pushed through an increase in the income tax in early January of 2011, only a few days before 
the new General Assembly took office. The new tax took effect on January 1, 2011 (Long, 
October 16, 2014, 26-27).  The bill increased the individual income tax from 3.0 to 5.0 percent 
and the corporate income tax from 4.8 to 7.0 percent.  
 The bill passed without a single Republican vote in the House or Senate, and the 
opposition party immediately decried it as “the largest tax increase in Illinois history” although 
that charge could be debated in view of the fact that Richard Ogilvie, a Republican, in 1969 had 
introduced and passed the original Illinois income tax plan, with a major boost from then 
Chicago Mayor, Richard J. Daley, and with both Republican and Democratic votes. The historic 
Ogilvie plan totally revamped the entire revenue system in Illinois and has been the foundation 
for the Illinois revenue system for the past fifty years.  It originally provided a flat individual tax 
rate of 2.5 percent and a corporate rate of 4.0 percent.   
The 2011 income tax increase was a major issue for two reasons.  First, Republicans 
almost always oppose tax increases and this one was no different. Second, it provided 
approximately five billion dollars of new tax revenue, which immediately started to fill the 
state’s coffers early in 2011. What to do with the new revenue became a major issue in Illinois 
politics in subsequent years.    
From the beginning of 2011 until January 1 of 2015, the Illinois budget benefitted 
significantly from the new income tax revenue.  At five billion dollars a year the tax increase 
added a constant source of new revenue that allowed the General Assembly and the governor to 
claim that the budget was “balanced,” although that claim was a stretch that relied on some 
creative accounting. Nevertheless, it became clear to close observers of the budget that some of 
the backlog of accumulated bills was being paid down, and state bills were being paid much 
closer to on time than at any point in the recent past. This timelier payment saved interest 
penalties on late payments, which were fixed by law at 12 percent on most bills.   
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The tax increases, and what the Democrats had or had not accomplished, was one of the 
central issues of the statewide elections of November 2014.  The Republicans ran on the charge 
that Quinn was an incompetent manager of the government and that his tax increase had been 
entirely squandered on new programs and waste rather than genuinely balancing the budget or 
paying down the accumulated stack of bills.  Pensions, and the constant deficit in that account, 
continued to be a major problem because of the long-term accumulated debt which, by then, 
came to well over $100 billion.  It is important to note, however, that during the period 2011 
through 2015, the state had at least met its annual obligations to fund the pension system, and 
took no more “pension holidays,” although the accumulated debt had not been addressed.  This 
progress was possible entirely because of the new revenue from the 2011 tax increase (Long, 
2011 and 2016).  
 All this progress on addressing the structural deficit came to an abrupt halt on January 1, 
2015, as a result of the November elections, when Bruce Rauner beat Quinn by a narrow margin 
of 31,000 votes (Jackson, January 2015).  After Rauner beat Quinn, the Democrats in the 
General Assembly were in no mood to support the continuation of the temporary income tax 
increase. It expired on the first day of January 2015. The decision to make the income tax 
increase of 2011 a “temporary” one that expired on New Year’s Day of 2015 was one of the 
most consequential budget decisions made since Illinois shifted to the income tax originally 
(Stone, 2014).  When the temporary tax increase expired, the rates contracted to 3.75 percent for 
individuals and 5.25 percent for corporations, jolting the Illinois budget (Long, October 16, 
2014, 26-27; Rushton, 2014).  The aphorism that “elections have consequences” certainly held 
true for the general election in Illinois in 2014.   
Bruce Rauner, a newcomer to the political wars, effectively led the charge against Pat 
Quinn. He was a successful businessman who had amassed a fortune, variously estimated to 
range up to approximately half a billion dollars, and had never sought public office before 
(although he had been peripherally involved in Illinois and Chicago politics, mostly as a 
philanthropist and source of campaign funds for other candidates).  It is plausible to believe that 
Rauner’s success in the business world, and especially the personal fortune he had amassed, gave 
him particular credibility when he talked about revenue and the budget, and his personal 
financial assets certainly gave him a boost in getting his name recognized and his message 
delivered across the state, even though he was unknown outside Chicago at the beginning of the 
campaign (Yaccion, 2014; Korecki, 2014).   
Rauner used his personal fortune both to fund his own campaign and to help other 
Republicans running for the General Assembly and lower offices.  He became the epitome of the 
new breed of business leaders who turn to politics in middle age as a new and challenging outlet 
for their considerable ambition and ego.  There are now twelve mega-millionaire governors 
across the United States and various other extraordinarily rich men and women who became 
Senators or Congressmen after making or inheriting their fortunes.  The most extraordinary and 
unprecedented example of such of billionaire businessman and celebrity starting at the top 
without any prior governmental or political experience is, of course, Donald J. Trump, the 45th 
president of the United States. Rauner was a forerunner of Trump by two years.   
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At the time, however, there had been several other previous candidates who were quite 
wealthy and turned to politics seeking either the Illinois governor’s office or a seat in the United 
States Senate, but none of the previous mega millionaires won. For example, there was Blair 
Hull, Jack Ryan, and Al Hofeld, all of whom got beat either in the primary or the general 
election or dropped out because of personal scandals not previously uncovered because they had 
not been vetted in the fire of a high level campaign.  The lack of success for rich newcomers was 
probably related Illinois’ status as a competitive strong-party state, according to political 
scientists who study these patterns comparatively (Ranney, 1965). In the next section we explore 
how and why these fundamental changes have taken place in the political parties’ basic 
recruitment patterns and how these have impacted the parties and the ability of the winners to 
govern.   
3 THE ILLINOIS EXPERIENCE: AN ILLUSTRATION OF PARTY TRENDS IN THE 
U.S.    
Outsider candidates are usually anathema to the traditional party organizations, which generally 
do not welcome newcomers from the outside who want to start at the top.  However, the modern 
demands for money and/or celebrity have changed the parameters of American politics, and 
Illinois is no exception to those trends—despite the desires of the traditional party organizations. 
Parties have increasingly lost control of who will wear the party’s identity, enjoy the party’s 
imprimatur, and get the privilege of using the party’s label on the general election ballot.   
The established party infrastructure may influence the outcomes of primaries and general 
elections at the margins these days, but they certainly do not control them anywhere near the 
extent they did in the days of Richard J. Daley, the last of the old-time party bosses and most 
important Democrat in Illinois.  
The demise of the Daley machine was illustrated by Lori Lightfoot’s defeat of Toni 
Preckwinkle in the election for Mayor of the City of Chicago on April 2, 2019.  Preckwinkle was 
not only the Chair of the Cook County Board, but she was also Chair of the Cook County 
Democratic Party (a position Richard J. Daley once held and which fed his political power base). 
This election was just the latest evidence that the highly organized and effective party 
organizations of the past are now but a pale shadow of their former glory in the city that 
epitomized the last successful strong-party “machine” in the nation (Pearson, April 7, 2019, A-
1). 
What we have now achieved in the United States is a peculiarly American version of 
what, in classic political science literature, is termed “The Responsible Parties” model.  This 
model of the party was originally articulated most notably by E. E. Schattsneider and his 
associates in a report to the American Political Science Association in 1950 (APSA Committee 
Report; also:  Schattschneider, 1942, 1960).  The model advanced in that report was based on the 
European parties in Parliamentary democracies, which led to Party Governments in those nations 
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(Pomper, 2001; Rhode and Aldrich, 2010).  Those European party types meet the following 
requirements: 
1.  The parties must stand for philosophies, policies and issues that are clearly 
articulated. 
2. Candidates are recruited for public office who meet or agree with those requirements. 
3. They then run on a party platform which clearly articulates those party platforms for 
which the party stands. 
4. When elected, the partisans then seek to implement the programs and policies on 
which they ran. 
5. The office holders are then evaluated in the next election and judged by whether their 
policies were carried out and how the programs and policies worked out.  
From the founding of the republic, the major outline of the dominant two-party system 
has evolved over the last two hundred and thirty years to the extremely polarized party system 
we know today.  Along the way the original party systems broke up, new coalitions were formed, 
and new names emerged.  The Federalists became the core of the new Whigs, and the 
Democratic-Republican Party became the Democrats with the election of Andrew Jackson in 
1828.  Then the Whigs broke up and disappeared because of their inability to handle the looming 
conflicts that led to the Civil War.  In 1854 in a meeting in Ripon, Wisconsin, a new party—the 
Republicans—was formed.  In 1860, just six years later the Republicans elected their first 
president, Abraham Lincoln, who had previously been a Whig.  Since then, these two major 
parties have dominated American politics, although major third-party challengers have come and 
gone in subsequent electoral battles. 
While the two major parties, and their labels, have remained the same since the 1860s, 
new and different coalitions have formed and broken up, as new pressures created new 
alignments.  The two parties also have effectively changed positions on the critical question of 
the power of the states as opposed to the power of the national government.  They also have both 
been transformed in terms of the kinds of political parties we have in this country. Those changes 
also reflect the deeply polarized parties that have developed at both the leadership and voter 
levels we have in America today. That shift marks the change from the dominant Pragmatic 
Party of the first 150 years of our history to a new and uniquely American form of the party 
which constitutes a particularly American version of the classic “Responsible Party Model” 
adopted from the European models and adapted to the requirements of a presidential and 
separation of powers system (Jackson, 2015).  This Responsible Party Model also produces what 
Rhode and Aldrich term the “Conditional Party Government,” which we have in both the federal 
government and in many state governments like Illinois today (Rhode and Aldrich, 2010).   
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4 BRUCE RAUNER: THE AMATEUR CHIEF EXECUTIVE AND THE PROBLEMS 
OF GOVERNING  
In section two we examined the Blagojevich and Quinn eras in Illinois, two governors who came 
up through the more traditional routes to obtain the top office in the state.  The governors before 
them were Republicans George Ryan, Jim Edgar and Jim Thompson, who also became governor 
through the usual professional party recruitment routes. That era came to an end with the 
nomination and election of Bruce Rauner.  In November of 2014 Rauner represented and led the 
trend toward rich amateurs who refused to play by the ordinary recruitment and party rules and 
instead used their vast personal fortunes to start at the top.  He achieved his statewide victory 
with his proud “outsider” mantle, compared to Pat Quinn, who had been in politics almost all his 
adult life.  It was a closely contested race down to the end, but Rauner prevailed by a very 
narrow margin when the ballots were all counted (Jackson, January 2015). 
In January of 2015 Bruce Rauner became the first Republican to be inaugurated since 
George Ryan in 1998.  One of the major reasons for Rauner’s victory over Quinn was the 2011 
income tax increase.  As we noted earlier, Quinn stoutly maintained that it was a vital necessity 
to tackle the structural deficit.  Rauner and the Republicans maintained that the money had been 
squandered and that no progress had been made on cleaning up Illinois’ chronic budget deficit.  
The voters endorsed the Rauner view by a narrow margin. This narrow margin, and Rauner’s 
lack of coattails that left the General Assembly firmly under the control of the Democrats, were 
important conditions of his ultimate inability to govern.   
Rauner quickly established himself as a hard-driving CEO who had a grand plan and a 
burning ambition to control Illinois government and reform it or remake it across a number of 
dimensions.  He called his plan “the Illinois Turnaround Agenda.” The platform consisted of a 
wide variety of changes and reforms, some of which had long been debated by “good 
government” advocates, and some of which would be typical of any Republican with the 
traditional commitments to lower taxes and smaller government (Leonard, 2017). 
For the “good government” people, Rauner’s plan offered redistricting reforms, term 
limits for legislators, term limits for legislative leaders, a reduction in corruption, and open 
primaries.  For the traditional Republicans, Rauner promised smaller government that would also 
be much more friendly to business, reform of the state’s worker’s compensation rules, and curbs 
on the power of labor unions. He attempted to accomplish those objectives by giving local 
governmental bodies the legal authority to avoid the state’s prevailing wage requirements, 
making right-to-work a local option, and fiercely opposing the unions’ rights to the “fair shares” 
requirements for paying union dues. In June of 2018 the Republicans won the “fair share” 
argument in the U.S. Supreme Court in the Janus decision, an Illinois case whose attorneys 
Rauner supported financially.  All in all it was a platform that could and did attract support from 
a wide variety of Republican factions and conservative groups. It likewise stimulated spirited and 
even implacable opposition from groups on the other side, especially organized labor and the 
leadership of the Democratic Party in Illinois.   
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As soon as it was introduced, the Turnaround Agenda hit a wall of resistance from the 
Democrats and sometimes only begrudging support from Rauner’s Republican colleagues in the 
General Assembly. It also mobilized the labor unions, some of which had sat out the 2014 
governor’s race because of their unhappiness with Pat Quinn, or at best offered him only tepid 
support.  The existential threat to the unions posed by the Rauner agenda was very similar to the 
larger political and policy agenda that had been advocated and funded by the conservative 
billionaire Koch Brothers for much of the previous decade (Mayer, 2016).  The Kochs’ national 
agenda found much success in a series of states in the south and in the midwest, such as Kansas 
and Wisconsin (Cramer, 2016). In fact, Rauner publicly endorsed the accomplishments of 
Governor Scott Walker in Wisconsin and held him up as a role model. In 2015, with Rauner’s 
election, the movement was extended to Illinois, and the question was whether this model for 
state government could be successful in a big, industrial state like Illinois, which had been a 
union stronghold.     
After his election Rauner constantly campaigned across the state on the merits of the 
plan, and had his allies in the legislature introduce a series of bills that would have implemented 
his agenda.  The unyielding resistance of the Democrats, who controlled the majority in the 
General Assembly, and Rauner’s inability to build coalitions, even within his own party, ensured 
that the plan’s major components would remain unrealized by the time the race for his second 
term came around in 2018.   
Prominent among the announced objectives of Rauner’s plan was a balanced budget, 
although he never achieved one. His critics maintained that he never even introduced a truly 
balanced budget during his four years in office.   
Rather, the budget wars between the Republican governor and the Democratic General 
Assembly led to a protracted gridlock.  This lack of ability to compromise produced a political 
disagreement so deep and so profound the state was literally unable to perform one of its most 
fundamental functions: to adopt an annual budget and appropriate money for state agencies in 
support of basic services, as provided for in the state Constitution, which clearly expects and 
requires them to do so annually.  That meant that for two consecutive fiscal years, FY2016 and 
FY2017, the state did not have an official budget and a great deal of money was spent that was 
not appropriated by the General Assembly.  Instead, money was spent based on the requirements 
of receiving matching funds from the federal government, various court orders, and a series of 
“stopgap” temporary budget measures adopted to fill the most compelling current needs.  This 
led to approximately 90 percent of the budget being doled out, piecemeal, with no overall plan.  
All state agencies suffered dislocations, some of which were severe, especially with 
regards to personnel, which always consume about three-quarters of a public budget, and in 
terms of services, especially for the neediest elements of society. Illinois’ personnel base shrank 
from approximately 70,000 to 49,000, a thirty percent reduction, during Pat Quinn’s and Bruce 
Rauner’s eras (Nowlan, 2019, 5).  
The state’s human services, and the non-profit agencies that get the major share of their 
budget from the state, suffered the most.  K-12 education had to deal with severe dislocations 
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and uncertainty as well; however, the governor and General Assembly held them essentially 
harmless by agreeing to provide their base budgets on the FY2015 precedent level.   
Higher education was the other major component of the state’s budget that suffered most 
during the stalemate.  This meant that the state’s twelve public universities and 48 community 
colleges did not receive a regular appropriation from the state for two consecutive years.  They 
did receive, usually belatedly and about halfway through the fiscal year, a “stopgap budget” that 
was designed to carry them through their immediate crisis. However those stopgap budgets were 
less than half of the original base budgets each year.  When the two year drought finally ended at 
the start of Fiscal year 2018, higher education in Illinois had lost almost sixty percent of its base 
budget over those two years.  These were reductions so deep that no large complex organization 
could sustain them without major and long-lasting damage, and it will take many years for 
Illinois higher education to recuperate (Stenhouse, September 6, 2017; Esch, June 17, 2018, 1).   
One of the reasons the damage to Illinois higher education was so extensive was the 
failure of the governor and the General Assembly to fund the Illinois Monetary Awards Program, 
or MAP grants.  MAP grants are the primary source of state support directed to students to help 
low and moderate-income students afford to pay tuition.  This constituted a drastic loss to the 
universities and community colleges alike, since it is one of the major revenue streams for the 
income fund which is essentially the general revenue item in higher education budgets.   
Most of the major universities and many of the community colleges decided to fund the 
MAP grants from internal fund sources for the first fiscal year.  The money had been promised 
by the state to the students and their parents, and it would have been a breach of faith to do 
otherwise.  However, by the second year, some of the institutions could no longer sustain that 
level of budgetary loss and could not fund the MAP grants, while others went deeper into debt 
for a second year.  In a state that was already losing almost 50 percent of its high school 
graduates, who chose other states for their college homes, this was a self-inflicted wound that 
would be difficult to overcome. This story is told in more detail in our earlier paper: The Roots of 
Gridlock (Jackson, Leonard, and Deitz, 2016).   
Finally, the budgetary crisis came to an end in July of 2017, when the legislature was able 
to override Governor Rauner’s earlier veto and pass a budget for FY2018.  That budget 
contained a permanent increase of the state income tax to 4.95 percent and the corporate income 
tax to 7.0 percent. Overall this increase was expected to yield approximately $5 billion a year, 
comparable to what the original temporary increase had produced.  
A total of ten Republicans in the House and one in the Senate voted with the Democrats 
to override the governor’s veto, and for the first time in over two years, the state had a budget 
passed by the state legislature, although not signed by the governor (Bosman and Davey, July 
2017).  
The budget wars, not surprisingly, became one of the major issues in the fall 2018 
statewide races.  The Republicans, led by Governor Rauner, ran on a platform that advocated for 
a tax reduction, although reduced to what level was never entirely clear.  The Democrats, led by 
another wealthy businessman, J. B. Pritzker, advocated for the current base budget with marginal 
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adjustments for the next two years.  Pritzker’s signature issue became his spirited advocacy for a 
graduated or progressive income tax system, which would radically shift the flat rate system in 
effect since the 1970 Constitution was adopted.  If Pritzker were to succeed in transforming the 
income tax system from a flat tax to a progressive tax, it would constitute the most significant 
change in the Illinois tax system since Richard Ogilvie transformed the system to one based on 
the income tax in 1969. 
Pritzker also advocated for, or at least considered, some new tax sources including the 
legalization of recreational marijuana, the expansion of gambling, a new tax on sports betting 
(and later a new tax on plastic bags) as a way to close the $3.4 billion hole in the FY2020 budget.  
Those proposals, too, became the fodder for the campaign commercials and the political dialogue 
of the fall 2018 campaigns. 
Pritzker for his part claimed that Rauner had failed to govern competently and he pointed 
to the budgetary impasse and the gridlock of Rauner’s last two years as Exhibit A in his case 
against the governor.  Most Democrats running for the General Assembly either joined Pritzker 
in his advocacy for a new tax system or tried to stay quiet and see what the outcome of the 
governor’s race might bring.  Most Republican candidates joined Rauner’s narrative with the 
promise of lower taxes and smaller government as the cure for the state’s ills.  All of this is told 
in greater detail in an earlier paper we published (Jackson, January, 2019).   
In the end the Democrats scored a decisive victory.  Pritzker beat Rauner by 713,995 total 
popular votes, or by a 54.5 to 38.8 percent margin (Illinois State Board of Elections. 
https://www.elections.il.gov/ElectionResults).  The Democrats increased their advantage in both 
the House and the Senate and enjoyed supermajority status in both bodies.  Pritzker’s victory set 
off a statewide dialogue about the income tax system and the state’s fundamental needs.  The 
fight focused on Pritzker’s signature plan for a progressive income tax.  
 Soon after the election ended and he was sworn in, Governor Pritzker unveiled the 
brackets he advocated. This was a necessary next step in the legislative process and basic agenda 
setting since he had received withering criticism from the Republicans and from much of the 
media for not unveiling his bracket recommendations before the election.  Pritzker’s response 
during the campaign was that these details had to be negotiated and worked out with the General 
Assembly in the particulars of legislation that would be introduced after he was elected. 
Pritzker advocated a plan which, he claimed, would actually save 97 percent of Illinois 
taxpayers on their income tax bill.  Critics quickly pointed out that the savings would be 
relatively small for most middle-class taxpayers.  Pritzker also proposed that the top 1 percent, 
i.e. those making more than $l million per year, would pay for most of the increase with a 3 
percent addition to their taxes (from 4.95 to 7.95 percent) and he signaled that those making 
$250,000 per year and above would also pay more (in a range from 4.95 to 7.95 percent).   
Pritzker’s plan to shift from a flat tax to a progressive income tax would represent the 
most important change since Richard Ogilvie introduced the state flat-rate income tax system in 
1969.  This proposal be a watershed moment in Illinois history, if it could be enacted into law 
with an amendment to the state Constitution. 
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The Republicans and other conservative critics charged that this was simply a way for the 
camel to get its nose under the tent, and predicted a significant middle class tax increase at the 
first opportunity that Pritzker and his allies saw for obtaining new revenue. The defenders of the 
Pritzker plan pointed out that the income tax levels can be decreased or increased now under the 
flat tax system if the legislature and the governor agree on new rates and that it would be no 
easier to increase taxes under the new system than it is now. As the clock ticked down toward the 
May 31, 2019 deadline for the budget to be adopted the state’s political dialogue and conflict 
heated up as both Pritzker’s plan for the graduated income tax increase and the need for new 
revenue in excess of three billion dollars was immediate and also highly contentious.  
The research questions that follow in the empirical section of this report cover the voters’ 
assessment of the leaders and political battles of Illinois since 2008, the midway point of 
Blagojevich’s second term.  While Blagojevich and two other governors have come and gone 
since then, most of the problems, especially those associated with the budget and the state 
pension systems, remain the same.  Our polls have reflected those conflicts and have offered a 
constant assessment of where the voting public stands on these crucial issues that have 
dominated the political agenda from 2008 through the spring of 2019.  This current paper 
summarizes and extends that narrative.   
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5 THE DATA ANALYSIS 
5.1 DIRECTION OF THE NATION, STATE, AND LOCAL AREA 
We have always started the surveys with generic questions regarding the direction of the nation, 
the state, and local areas of government.  These questions provide an overall picture of the 
voters’ assessments of how the governments at those three levels are performing and the quality 
of life in general.  It is also a measure of whether the voters are generally happy with their own 
outlook or pessimistic regarding their prospects for the future.  They are often regarded as 
something of a surrogate for respondents’ views of the current president or the governor and how 
they are doing in office.  This overall view gives us an ability to do comparisons among the three 
levels of government on how well the parties and their leaders are performing and governing.   
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Figure 1. Direction of the United States 
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The first thing that stands out in Table 1 and Figure 1 is how negative the evaluations are 
across the entire time period.  There is not a single year when the “right direction” was chosen by 
more voters than the “wrong direction” option.  In most years the differences were marked, most 
recently on the order of two negative evaluations for every one positive. This negative evaluation 
by the voters of Illinois is not much different from views held by the rest of the nation in national 
polls. This negativity generally prevails regardless of who is president or which party is in 
power.  Americans used to be known for their optimistic outlook, but in recent years this has not 
been the prevailing perspective.  Illinois voters have not been any different in the twelve years 
the Simon Poll has been in the field.   
The fact that the most extreme variation and widest shift in outlook occurred between 
2008 and 2009 is notable.  That shift should be placed in the context of what was happening in 
the nation at the time.  In the spring of 2008, when the Simon Poll began, George W. Bush’s 
second term was drawing to a close.  The Republicans had lost control of the Congress in the 
mid-term elections in the fall of 2006, and their loss was widely attributed to the American 
public’s general unhappiness with the war in Iraq, and the widespread disenchantment with the 
Bush Administration.  The dark clouds of economic uncertainty were gathering, although it was 
September of that year when the financial crisis broke open clearly and the national and world 
economies teetered on the brink of disaster.  Many banks and businesses collapsed, and millions 
lost their jobs.  The unemployment rate ballooned to well above ten percent in a matter of 
months.  Not surprisingly, then, Illinois voters shared the national sense of things not going in 
the right direction by a nine to one margin, which is the high-water mark for negative 
evaluations. 
By the time we took our next poll in the spring of 2009, the nation had elected Barack 
Obama as president. At the end of his term, George W. Bush and his Treasury Secretary, Hank 
Paulson, frantically working with Ben Bernanke at the Federal Reserve, and with a bi-partisan 
coalition of Republicans and Democrats alike in Congress, had taken the first steps necessary to 
bail out the banks and put the economy on a path to recovery.  They were aided in this plan by 
the Democrats as Barack Obama assembled the necessary coalition in congress, first as a 
candidate and then as president-elect. From November to January the transition from Bush to 
Obama took place smoothly, with professionalism and cooperation on both sides, as the Bush 
Administration gave way to the early days of the first Obama Administration. 
In the spring of 2009 this transition provided the backdrop for the poll on right direction-
wrong direction.  Voters in Illinois were much more positive about the early days of Obama’s 
presidency.  This carried over from the Democrats to Independents and even some Republicans 
as they showed hope and some confidence in a more positive direction for the nation: 42 percent 
right direction vs. 50 percent wrong direction, the most positive ratio attained in our polls.  Later 
in 2009 the Tea Party movement was born out of a tirade by an MSNBC economics reporter 
from the floor of the Board of Trade in Chicago. His rant was against the “elites” of the Federal 
Reserve, the Congress, and the White House for their steps in bailing out the big banks, which 
had caused or materially abetted the subprime loan disaster.  Bad subprime loans then infected 
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more legitimate loans, especially housing loans, and caused savings and loan companies and big 
banks to fail or be merged.  
 A narrative was born then and there, and a populist theme was adopted that said the 
economic and political elites of both parties had conspired to bail out the banks and the financial 
institutions, which had caused the economic meltdown in the first place. They then sent the bill 
to the average taxpayers.  This narrative is an integral part of the “politics of resentment,” which 
has tended to dominate American politics since then (Cramer, 2016).  The force of this narrative 
helped to power the Republican take-overs of the Congress in the mid-term elections in 2010 and 
2014, and it ultimately proved to be the key explanation for the campaign that propelled Donald 
Trump to the White House in 2016. This narrative is also being captured in the “right 
track/wrong track” polling responses.    
The polarization that had already marked American politics since the 1990s increased 
exponentially as every facet of American politics was marked by sharp partisanship, and the 
inability to compromise further fueled public disenchantment. Such alienation always makes it 
hard, and at times impossible, to govern in a separation of powers presidential system. If the two 
parties are so polarized at the top that those in office cannot compromise, and the partisans at the 
base on both sides consider the other party to be not just the loyal opposition but people who are 
downright disloyal, then our politics become so toxic that it is difficult for any administration to 
govern (Jackson, 2015).   
Public opinion polls have consistently documented the polarization of American politics 
for both decades of the 21st Century and marked its impact on the capacity of the political system 
to function.  Scholars who study political parties describe the baneful effects of excessive 
polarization on the ability to govern as follows:        
“Politicians can appeal to feelings of contempt, anger, and fear to draw more citizens 
into the political arena.  However, having repeatedly stoked those negative feelings 
among party supporters, it can be difficult for politicians to ride that tiger when 
governing requires negotiation and compromise.  If partisans do not view the other side 
as legitimate, then they are less likely to support compromise with the opposition” 
(Kimball, Summary, and Vorst, 2014, 53).   
David Kimball and his associates go on to assert that this mistrust and disdain toward the 
other party helps explain the governmental shutdown of 2013 when a fight between President 
Obama and House Republicans over the budget and the need to raise the debt ceiling reached an 
impasse. The Tea Party faction, now relabeled in the U. S. House as “The Freedom Caucus,” 
made it impossible for Speaker John Boehner to sell the compromise on the budget he had 
negotiated with Obama. Ultimately Obama decided to essentially stop seeking common ground 
with the Republicans and shift instead to Executive Orders and administrative rules as his major 
strategy for getting anything done during the remainder of his term (Mann and Dionne, 2012; 
Dionne, Ornstein, and Mann, 2017).  Through the rest of Obama’s time in office, the crisis of 
polarization continued and deepened the gridlock that had been in place since the Republicans 
took over the House in the 2010 mid-term elections. 
The Climate of Opinion in Illinois 2008-2019: Gridlock Broken? 
 The Simon Review: Paper #56 | 20 
This negative feeling toward the partisans of the other party is what Alan Abramowitz 
and Steven Webster call “Negative Partisanship,” which they maintain is the dominant feeling 
motivating the base of both parties.  They say, “Conservatives and liberals don’t just disagree—
they actually hate each other.  And it’s getting uglier… Republicans might not love the president, 
but they absolutely loathe his Democratic adversaries. And it’s also true of Democrats who 
might be consumed by their internal feuds over foreign policy and the proper role of government 
were it not for Trump.  Negative partisanship explains nearly everything in American politics 
today—from why Trump’s base is unlikely to abandon him even if, as he once said, he were to 
shoot someone on Fifth Avenue, to why it was so easy for vulnerable red-state Democrats to 
resist defecting on the health care bill.” (Politico, September 6, 2017). 
The “direction of the United States” questions are an important component of our 
assessment of those negative trends and polarization in the nation’s politics. The direct tapping 
of trends in both party identification and political ideology, which are reported in the next 
section, are the other two components.   
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From Table 2 it is evident that although the aggregate view of how things are going in the 
U. S. may be fairly stable, the internal dynamics of the poll results can vary significantly.  That 
variation is also correlated closely with which party has just taken the White House or holds the 
presidency for a considerable period.  There are dramatic shifts when the party controlling the 
White House changes hands.  For example, only 1 percent of Democratic respondents said things 
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were going in the right direction in the spring of 2008, while an overwhelming 96 percent chose 
wrong direction.  Then in spring of 2009, just three months after Barrack Obama had moved into 
the White House, Illinois Democrats chose right direction at 74 percent compared to wrong 
direction at only 24 percent. By comparison, 86 percent of the Republicans said wrong direction 
compared to 12 percent who said right direction that year, with the Independents in between—
although leaning in a more positive direction, closer to the Democrats’ views.   
The next time the presidency switched parties is depicted on the right side of Table 2 
when Obama gave way to Donald Trump between our 2016 and 2017 polls.  There the shift was 
dramatically in the opposite direction.  In 2016, 47 percent of the Democratic respondents chose 
right direction compared to 42 percent who chose wrong direction. In 2017, only 8 percent of 
Democrats thought the country was going in the right direction and fully 85 percent said wrong 
direction. 
The Republicans displayed this same pattern in reverse in 2016 compared to 2017. In 
2016 only 7 percent of Republicans said right direction and 88 percent said wrong direction.  The 
Independents as usual fell between the two partisan groups with 22 percent right direction in 
2016 and 69% percent wrong direction.  Then in 2017, after the election of Donald Trump, 
Republicans chose right direction over wrong direction by a 63 to 26 percent margin.  Democrats 
even more dramatically shifted with only 8 percent saying right direction and 85 percent wrong 
direction in 2017. 
The partisan patterns established in 2017 continued almost undisturbed in both the 2018 
and 2019 spring polls.  This is vivid and tangible evidence of that extreme polarization.  Political 
party identification has become an intrinsic part of the personal identities of tens of millions of 
Americans and it filters how we seen the world and how we judge political figures and issues 
(Greene, et al. 2002).  It has been a crucial and parsimonious psychological cue, since the voting 
behavior literature of six decades ago first identified it.  Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 
in their classic voting behavior book, The American Voter, put it this way: “Identification with a 
party raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favorable to his 
partisan orientation” (Campbell et al., 1960, 133).  
Partisanship also helps formulate and drive more deeply held belief systems and 
ideological commitments.  With the fall 2020 presidential election now looming, and the 
January, 2021 inauguration hard on its heels, we fully expect to see the 2008 to 2009 and the 
2016 to 2017 transitions to take place if the Democrats win, and the 2012 to 2013 stability to stay 
in place if Donald Trump wins a second term.  Either way, party identification is now deeply 
ingrained in the minds of most American voters and is used by journalists, political scientists, 
and other academics as one of the most powerful explanatory variables (and many analysts 
would maintain the most powerful) for how people evaluate candidates and issues and how they 
vote.   
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Table 3. Direction of Illinois 
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Figure 2. Direction of Illinois 
 
 Table 3 and Figure 2 present the results of the “right/wrong direction” question at the 
state level.  The ordinary pattern found in other states is that the voters are most negative about 
the nation as a whole, then second most critical of the direction of the state, and then most 
sanguine about their own city or local area.  That has not been the history of our findings for 
Illinois, as is evident from Table 3. 
 When our first soundings with the Simon Poll were made in 2008, the results were 
surprisingly negative even though for that year the direction for the national evaluations were 
even more negative than the state.  As a reminder: 2008 was the last year of the George W. Bush 
presidency and the presidential campaign was well under way when our poll was taken.  It was 
also the second year of Blagojevich’s second term, although he had not yet been indicted and 
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arrested by the federal government.  So, for that one year Illinois resembled the more common 
national pattern. 
 However, 2008 was the last year in our series when the state’s direction was evaluated 
more positively than that for the country at large.  Starting in 2009, and in every year since, the 
right direction/wrong direction result for the state was negative by lopsided numbers.  The 
negative numbers bottomed out in an extraordinary consistent run of three consecutive recent 
years, 2016, 2017, and 2018, when the voters chose wrong direction at 84 percent and right 
direction at 9 percent.   
 As the introduction to this paper recounted, 2016 and 2017 were the years of legislative 
gridlock, when Governor Rauner was so divided from the majority in the General Assembly, the 
normal order of managing the state broke down entirely and the state government simply failed 
to adopt a budget for fiscal years 2016 and 2017. 
Finally, in early July of 2018 the General Assembly passed a budget by overriding 
Governor Rauner’s veto.  The governor’s race was already well under way and in the November 
election, Rauner was defeated by J. B. Pritzker by a record margin. 
It should probably not be too surprising, then, to find that when our poll was taken in 
March of 2019, just two months into the Pritzker administration, the “right direction” figures had 
improved notably (22 percent) and the wrong direction had declined to “only” 67 percent.  These 
results show a state with the right direction to wrong direction indicators still very much under 
water, but somewhat improved.   
It should not come as a surprise to learn that the evaluation of the respondents’ perception 
of the “right direction/wrong direction” health of the state is clearly dependent on partisanship.  
It varies systematically according to which party is in control of the executive branch via the 
governor’s office.  That is the basic lesson of Table 4.   
 In 2008, with Rod Blagojevich in office, an anemic 6 percent of Republican respondents 
said the state was going in the right direction and 90 percent said wrong direction.  Democrats 
were only slightly more positive at 13 percent right direction and 77 percent wrong direction 
with Independents in between at 12 percent and 80 percent respectively.  2009 was only slightly 
more positive in the views of most partisans and the Independents. 
 In 2010 the overall right direction results dropped to 12 percent and the wrong direction 
soared to 80 percent.  This was perhaps not surprising, since the Blagojevich impeachment and 
removal from office had occurred just two months before the poll was conducted.  But, that 
generally dour mood of the Illinois electorate continued unabated from 2010 and through all of 
Pat Quinn’s time in office through 2015, which was Bruce Rauner’s first year in office.  In 
general the Republicans were more negative by about a 25-30 percent margin each year - with 
the Independents looking much like the Republicans on this measure 
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Table 4. Direction of Illinois by Political Party 
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That negative balance carried over into Bruce Rauner’s four years in office.  But then it 
was propelled by the Democrats who abruptly shifted to being more negative than the 
Republicans, although the gap of negativity was not large, usually on the order of three to four 
percentage points. By 2018 both partisan groups were at 83 percent wrong direction with the 
Independents at 84 percent.  In light of these bi-partisan findings, it is not surprising that Bruce 
Rauner lost the governor’s office in a landslide in November of 2018. 
Nor is it surprising that in 2019 there was a notable shift again.  The wrong direction 
aggregate results declined to 67 percent, and the right direction increased to 22 percent.  This is 
not a phenomenally positive balance; however, it is a notable change in a positive direction. It 
can largely be attributed to shifts in a more positive direction by the Democrats and to a lesser 
extent, the Independents.  The Republicans stayed steady at 84 percent wrong direction in 2019. 
In the Press Release publicizing the 2019 poll’s results on March 21st Charlie Leonard 
wrote the following summary:  “Thinking back to a year ago, what changed in Illinois to cause 
more than one in eight voters to change their minds about the direction of the state? ... While 
there has been good economic news here and there, we have to think that a change in state 
leadership—the decisive victory of Governor J. B. Pritzker over the unpopular former governor, 
Bruce Rauner—has a lot to do with it, even though Governor Pritzker’s lukewarm approval 
rating doesn’t look like he’s received much of a ‘honeymoon’ period.” 
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We still believe that to be an important lesson we can learn from the time series-based 
analysis afforded by our polls.  Put succinctly: Governors matter; the ability to govern 
matters; the record of the party in power matters. This is also one of the fundamental 
requirements of the “Responsible Parties” and “Conditional Party Government” models 
outlined in the conceptual and theoretical introduction of this paper.   
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Figure 3. Direction of the Local Area 
 
Typically, local areas receive the most positive evaluations from the voters in terms of 
the right track/wrong track question (see Table 5 and Figure 3).  This probably goes back to 
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Thomas Jefferson, who strongly believed that the governments closest to the people would be the 
best government.  It is also probably related to the sense that the voters can know their local 
officials personally and deal with them on a face-to-face basis, at least in theory.  
Our results indicate that Jefferson’s faith in local governments still holds up with respect 
to this question.  Only the first poll in 2008 showed a net negative evaluation with 48 percent 
saying that the local area was going in the wrong direction as opposed to 43 percent who claimed 
the right direction with 9 percent undecided. Illinois voters appeared to be in a foul mood, which 
carried over even to their local governments in 2008, Blagojevich’s last full year as governor and 
George W. Bush’s last year in the White House.   
Starting in 2009 the net balance turned positive, with 52 percent claiming the right 
direction option and 41 percent saying that their local areas were going in the wrong direction.  
The right direction option dropped back to 46 percent in 2010 versus 42 percent who claimed the 
wrong direction, still producing a positive net of 4 percent. 
 
 
Table 6. Direction of the Local Area by Political Party 
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Starting in 2011 and in every year through 2019, the voters by a clear majority have 
given a thumbs-up on how their local areas are doing.  In fact, our most recent poll in 2019 
The Climate of Opinion in Illinois 2008-2019: Gridlock Broken? 
 The Simon Review: Paper #56 | 27 
marked the high-water mark for the positive evaluation, with 56 percent saying right direction 
versus only 35 percent who said the wrong direction.   
For all the negative news voters constantly hear about the state of Illinois and how badly 
it is doing, and how frequently its government and politics gets bashed, often by those in 
leadership positions themselves (including the last governor), this consistently positive outlook at 
the local level is always overlooked.  Local governments certainly have their problems and 
challenges in Illinois, often related to the economy, to their budgets and occasionally to 
scandals; however, those local officials laboring in relatively obscure and out of the way 
places and small offices should take some satisfaction from our consistent, twelve-year 
findings that a majority of Illinois voters believe their local cities and areas are moving in 
the right direction. 
Table 6 shows that the positive evaluations of the local cities and areas are somewhat 
dependent on partisanship, but not nearly as much as they are for the state and national 
evaluations.  In 2008 Democrats in Illinois were much more critical than positive about their 
local areas’ direction with only 35 percent saying right direction compared to 54 percent saying 
wrong direction.  Somewhat unexpectedly, 48 percent of Republicans in 2008 chose right 
direction compared to 43 percent who said wrong direction, with 9 percent undecided.  Perhaps 
this can be attributed to the Republican Party’s general belief in the importance and the power of 
local governments as opposed to state and national governments and the Jeffersonian ideal of the 
government closest to the people being the best form.  Independents again fell between the two 
major partisan groups in their evaluations. 
In 2009 partisan differences were still evident, although Democrats had moved to a solid 
majority positive with 54 percent saying right direction and only 43 percent saying wrong 
direction.  Perhaps this means our 2008 results for the Democrats were only an anomaly in the 
data.  In 2009 Republicans were even more positive about their confidence in the direction of 
their local areas, with 62 percent choosing right direction and only 33 percent taking the wrong 
direction option. 
Starting in 2010 and with each year thereafter, the partisan pattern has been stable with 
only minor variation.  Democrats were in the right direction column at well above 50 percent in 
each year subsequent to then.  They reached 60 percent in both 2014 and 2015 and 59 percent 
most recently in 2019.  The Republicans were slightly lower, but still above 50 percent right 
direction for all the years since 2013. Independents tended to be the most critical group in all of 
those years through 2018.  
Overall we think these results would have made Thomas Jefferson proud and tended to 
validate the thesis advanced by a notable political scientist, V. O. Key, that people would simply 
feel that they can have more confidence in the public officials closest to them and that “friends 
and neighbors government” is the level they can relate to best (Key, 1958).  This is a positive 
finding that public officials in Illinois can learn from and use in their ambitions to govern 
effectively. Perhaps they might help restore some faith and confidence in the state government as 
it tries to take on the monumental challenges it faces, especially in dealing with the state’s 
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structural deficit. After all, local governments are legally and constitutionally creatures of the 
state, and they can only prosper and be effective in the long run if the state does also.  Their 
problems and prospects are inextricably tied together.   
5.2 IDEOLOGICAL SELF IDENTIFICATION AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
Scholars who study public opinion in general and voting behavior in particular, recognize that 
the two most useful and powerful direct explanations for both political opinions and behavior are 
ideological identification and party identification.  Political scientists have been studying these 
phenomena for more than half a century, and they regard those two psychological attitudes and 
value commitments to be the most important independent variables captured by polls and other 
research methods (Campbell, et al., 1960). 
In the modern era of political polarization, mass differences in party identification and 
political ideology have come to define that polarization at both the individual voter level and 
mass political level.  When aggregated upward to the mass level of political and governmental 
jurisdictions they become the key explanations for why elections turn out as they do and then 
how and why governmental institutions, such as the Congress and state legislatures, behave as 
they do.  Thus, when governmental gridlock occurs, as has been all too frequent at the national, 
and especially state level recently, the immediate explanations are deep divisions in both 
ideology and partisanship, and an unwillingness to compromise on those basic commitments 
(Jackson, Leonard, and Deitz, 2016, 39).  
5.2.1 Ideology 
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2 The question asked: “Generally speaking, in politics today, do you consider yourself very liberal…?” 
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Figure 4. Ideology 
 
In Table 7 and Figure 4 we provide the longitudinal data for thirteen surveys covering 
twelve years of statewide polls in Illinois. The reader should note that in this narrative we 
collapse the “very liberal’ and “somewhat liberal” value labels into one liberal category and do 
the same with the conservative options to facilitate the discussion of these results.  Starting with 
the 2010 baseline first, the result was a total of 27 percent in the two liberal categories and 40 
percent in the two conservative categories.  By 2016, at the time of the publication of our first 
paper on the longitudinal data, this had changed somewhat in a liberal direction with a total of 33 
percent in the liberal categories (up by 5 percent) and 33 percent in the conservative categories 
(down by 7 percent).  These Illinois results, with movement in a more liberal direction, were 
consonant with national polls which still showed a conservative advantage but one which was 
also declining. 
These results were quite stable for both the 2017 and 2018 polls with the liberals at 35 
percent and 37 percent for those two years while the conservatives were at 34 and 33 percent 
respectively.  Over all these years the moderates remained remarkably stable in a narrow range 
of 27 percent to 29 percent, with the one exception of 34 percent in 2011.  On the other hand, the 
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most recent poll for 2019 is somewhat an anomaly where we find the two liberal categories total 
32 percent, while the two conservative categories combine for a 37 percent total.   
Over the long term, national polls have demonstrated a marked advantage for 
conservatives over liberals in ideological identification. This advantage long stood at 
approximately 2 to 1 and in the range of about 40 percent conservative to 20 percent liberal.  
This advantage to the conservatives has caused many conservative Republican leaders, as well as 
some pundits, to claim that the United States is essentially a ‘center right’ nation. 
In more recent years, however, the movement has been in the liberal direction with more 
recent national polls. In 2016 when our first paper on the longitudinal data was released national 
polls showed  a continuing conservative advantage, but one which had declined to 37 percent 
conservative to 24 percent liberal or a 13% conservative advantage.  In that same Gallup poll, 35 
percent claimed the moderate mantle, making it the second largest ideological group in the U. S. 
(Saad, Gallup, January 11, 2016). At the beginning of 2019 the conservatives still enjoyed an 
advantage nationally, but it was only by 9% with 35% of the respondents identifying as 
conservative and 26% liberal.  The moderates also tied the conservatives at 35%.  These more 
recent polls show that the conservatives have retained some advantage overall, but the liberal 
categories have moved up steadily while in the long term the moderates have lost some ground 
which is to be expected in our polarized environment.(Saad, Gallup, January 8, 2019).   
By comparison, our results for Illinois show that it is more liberal and less conservative 
than the nation as a whole, and Illinois has moved in a more liberal direction over this period, as 
has the nation.  Future polls at both the national level and in Illinois will show whether our 
results caught a temporary movement or some permanent changes, either of which would be 
important for the functioning (or malfunctioning) of both the state and federal governments 
(Jackson, Leonard, and Deitz, 2016, 40).   
5.2.2 Party Identification 
Party identification is probably the single most utilized and analyzed concept of all in the great 
body of political science research over the past six decades.  As was noted above, it has been 
shown repeatedly by a wide variety of studies to have systematic analytic power as an 
independent variable.  Party identification has a direct influence on voting and other political 
behavior and it also has an indirect influence.  Party identification is usually closely correlated 
with and undoubtedly directly influences a substantial part of the variance in voting.  
Increasingly so, as the nation has polarized, it has become a powerful explanation for mass 
voting behavior and it is even more important in political elite level behavior such as voting in 
the congress or state legislatures. 
Party identification’s indirect influence is exerted through shaping what messages we pay 
attention to and causing us to exhibit a systematic bias in the ways we evaluate these messages.  
The most important of these attitudinal components are candidate images and our positions on 
the issues of the campaign.  Extensive research has long demonstrated that party identification is 
a “master cue,” or the prism though which the voter evaluates the candidates and issues 
(Campbell, et al, 1960). 
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As one of the best-known examples, party identification is always correlated very closely 
with how the American public evaluates the job the president is doing or how well the governor 
of a state is doing.  Research also shows that party identification systematically influences 
voters’ positions on the issues. 
This also means that party identification is systematically related to a variety of 
individual and institutional outcomes across all levels of government in the United States.  As 
such it is one of the staple items included in almost all major public opinion studies.  Table 8 and 
Figure 5 provide the results for the Simon Poll for 2008 through 2019. 
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These results show that Democrats significantly outnumber Republicans in Illinois no 
matter whether one examines strong or weak partisans and/or Independents who lean toward one 
party or another.  This is, of course, what one would expect in a traditionally blue state, and 
particularly one with a major city, like Chicago, where the Democratic Party tradition is historic 
and very strong (Jackson, Leonard, and Deitz, 2016, 40).   
 Starting with our first poll in 2008, a total of 45 percent of the respondents said that they 
were strong Democrats (24 percent), weak Democrats (10 percent) or Independents who lean 
Democrat (11 percent).   
 Looking at the Republican side, there were 11 percent who claimed to be strong 
Republicans and an identical 11 percent who claimed the weak Republican identification leaving 
                                                                    
3 The question asked: “Generally speaking do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an 
Independent?” 
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another 10 percent who were Independents leaning Republican, for a total of 32 percent total in 
all Republican categories.  This was a 13 percentage-point disadvantage for the Republicans 
compared to the Democrats in Illinois.  Also this first poll taken in 2008 found that only 9 
percent of Illinois voters were pure Independents, that is, did not lean either way and consistently 
split their tickets in voting and exhibited no real preference for either party.   
 On a longitudinal basis, by 2012 the Democratic identifiers had reached 52 percent and 
the Republican identifiers were at 36 percent.  This is a 16 percentage-point advantage to the 
Democrats.  This substantial Democratic advantage held steadily in all the polls up through 2019, 
when there were 44 percent in the three Democratic categories and 33 percent in the Republican 
categories. Essentially, the Republicans at 33 percent in 2019 ended where they started with 32 
percent in our inaugural 2008 poll and 33 percent in the second year of 2009.   This provides an 
11-point head start for the Democrats which lets Democratic candidates begin each statewide 
campaign with a significant advantage.   Since fall 2014, the pure Independents have been in the 
double digits ranging from 17 percent in (2014b) to 15 percent in 2019. 
 
 
Figure 5. Party Identification 
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identification are included, compared to 30 percent for the Democrats and 42 percent as 
Independents. (Gallup, March, 2019). 
In 2015 the Republicans started the four years of the Rauner Administration in the 
minority but Rauner proved that they can win statewide with the right candidate and the right 
circumstances. As was recounted earlier, Rauner was a very rich businessman and he was willing 
to spend whatever it took for him to mount a competitive campaign.  In addition, the Democrats 
had to bear the burden of Rod Blagojevich’s corrupt administration and the perception that Pat 
Quinn had been an ineffective governor with incompetent management skills.  Quinn had the 
further burden of the income tax increase he had advocated and helped to steer through the 
General Assembly.  In effect, this meant Rauner’s major advantage in the fall of 2014 election 
was that he was not Pat Quinn (Jackson, 2015). 
We have recounted elsewhere in this paper and earlier papers the details of the Rauner vs. 
Pritzker campaign (Jackson, 2019).  Suffice it to say here that the Rauner Administration was not 
perceived to be an especially successful one, and the two-year governmental gridlock over the 
budget, coupled with the revenue losses and uncertainty it caused made him especially 
vulnerable in 2018, and J. B. Pritzker took maximum advantage of Rauner’s weaknesses.   
Voting behavior scholars have long known that if the “Independent-Leaners”, those who 
typically vote regularly for the same party are excluded, the ”Pure Independent” category shrinks 
dramatically. The low percentages in the pure Independent category are the reasonable by-
product of this deeply polarized era (Keith, et al., 1992).  Especially since the turn of the 21st 
century, more people have come to choose sides and to take on partisan identification -- similar 
to the way they identify with and root for their favorite sports team.  There are also similarities 
with religious and racial identification.  Partisanship has increasingly become an intrinsic part of 
the individual’s social identity and increasing important to how they view the larger world 
(Green, et al, 2002; Heatherton, 2001; Kimball, et al., 2014). 
As we become more ideological and more partisan in our individual identities, we also 
become more polarized nationally and societally.  At the aggregate level, this phenomenon plays 
out in the now widely recognized ‘red state’ versus ‘blue state’ designations (Gelman, 2008).  
Indeed, political cultures and aggregate partisanship have now become so ingrained and so 
endemic that the result is a very high correlation between the state-level voting outcomes for 
most states from year to year and election to election. Modern presidential elections start with 
approximately forty states whose partisan leanings are so engrained that the likelihood of them 
changing their past patterns is extremely small.  The Electoral College map, the blue state and 
red state distribution for the presidential elections is very similar every four years, and the best 
predictor of how the state will vote in a presidential election is how it voted four years 
previously.   
This leaves only eight to ten “swing states” or “battleground states” each presidential 
election year.  In 2016 the key battleground states were Florida, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, 
and Wisconsin, and when those all came in for Trump, albeit by only narrow margins of 
approximately 77,000 votes total, the race between Trump and Clinton was over, despite 
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Clinton’s three-million-vote margin of victory in the popular vote.  Nothing indicates the depth 
and consequences of this endemic polarization more clearly than the Electoral College -- 2016 
having been the second of five presidential elections held in the 21st Century that produced a split 
decision between the Electoral College vote and the popular vote.  Such a decision will remain a 
very possible outcome as long as the Electoral College remains in place and the nation continues 
to be so deeply polarized. A split decision could certainly happen again in 2020 or 2024.  
Partisanship and ideology remain at the base of these divisions.   
Illinois is not likely to be a battleground state anytime soon.  In presidential races Illinois 
has been a safely Democratic or ‘blue state’ since the 1988 election, when George H. W. Bush 
beat Michael Dukakis in Illinois.  Illinois has been a reliable vote for the Democrats since Bill 
Clinton beat Bush in 1992.  Thus, we are unlikely to see much direct evidence of the national 
campaigns aimed specifically toward the voters here in Illinois in the 2020 presidential election. 
This does not mean, however, that the Republicans cannot expect to win some statewide 
offices.  Although currently there are no statewide offices held by the Republicans, the last 
administration saw the Governor’s Office, the Lieutenant Governor’s Office, and for two years, 
the Comptroller’s Office controlled by the Republicans. Though Illinois certainly leans 
Democratic, the right Republican candidate, riding a promising partisan wave, can win in 
Illinois.  There also remain multiple counties and legislative districts where the Republicans have 
consistently won and controlled local politics since they came to prominence with the election of 
Abraham Lincoln in 1860. 
It is best to think of partisanship and ideology predominantly as stabilizing factors where 
immediate change from election to election is slow and unremarkable.  However, over longer 
trends, as shown in our data from the Simon Polls, there is also some change evident—usually 
gradual, but sometimes abrupt.  This means that the campaigns and the candidates themselves are 
also important, apart from their partisanship and ideology.  The candidates nominated by the 
parties, the amounts of money they can raise, their treatment by the mass media, and their ability 
to organize a compelling campaign and articulate a cogent narrative for their campaigns all still 
count for something and can create movement and change in the next election (Jackson, Leonard, 
and Deitz, 2016, 43-44). One of the most likely sources of such change in Illinois is the question 
of the deficit, taxation, and how to manage the challenges they represent, which has probably 
been the most salient issue long term in state politics for two generations.    
5.3 STRATEGIES FOR HANDLING THE BUDGET DEFICIT 
The Historical Context section at the beginning of this paper provided an account of the 
dire straits of the Illinois budget and the current proposals from the new Pritzker Administration 
to deal with this recurring problem.  In our earlier 2016 paper on these data, we also recounted in 
detail the long-time problems endemic to the Illinois budgetary process and how members of the 
General Assembly and a succession of Illinois governors had temporized with the challenge. 
They provided only one-year, band aid approaches to deal with a recurring structural deficit. This 
practice stretched well back into the 20th Century and had only gotten worse since the start of the 
21st Century.  This was a chronic problem that everyone recognized, but no one had the political 
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will and courage to fix. That is why we titled that earlier paper “The Roots of Gridlock” 
(Jackson, Leonard, and Deitz, 2016). We had no way of knowing then that the gridlock would go 
on for another full year after we released that paper in June of 2016.  We do know now that the 
damage from that impasse will take many more years to heal. We are also cautiously optimistic 
that the serious dialogue over what to do began in the 2018 campaign for governor, and that a 
feasible plan has been advanced by the Pritzker Administration and was widely debated in the 
spring term of the Illinois General Assembly. This dialog and conflict will continue in 2020. 
Our original paper was released and written at the beginning of the second year of the 
Rauner Administration.  At the time, it was clear that the decision by the General Assembly and 
Governor Rauner to let the temporary income tax increase expire on January 1, 2015 had blown 
a five billion dollar hole in the tenuously balanced budget.  Rauner recommended a FY2016 
budget which would have included draconian cuts to many programs and services, and not 
surprisingly the General Assembly refused to adopt those cuts.  The ensuing budgetary impasse 
meant that the state had no officially adopted budget for all of FY2016 and 2017.  We were in 
the middle of that crisis when the first paper was released, but it continued for another year. 
We devoted a major share of the questions and attention in our second poll, which was 
taken in 2009, to budgetary and revenue issues, which had already been on the state’s political 
agenda for a decade or more.  Since the problem did not go away, but instead festered and 
subsequently metastasized, we have retained those same question for almost all the polls taken 
since then.  Although this is a problem that we might wish would disappear, the decision of “who 
get- what, when and how”, and who will pay for it is always a central one in politics, so we 
continue to document the opinions of the voters of Illinois on this central challenge of governing.   
The wording of our first budgetary question has been as follows: 
“The state of Illinois has a budget deficit of over 3 billion dollars4. I am going to read three 
statements that people have made about how to fix the deficit and ask you which one comes 
closest to your views.  If you haven’t thought much about this issue just tell me that. 
 Illinois’ public programs and services have already been reduced significantly.  We can 
only fix the issue by taking in more revenue, such as a tax increase. 
 The state takes in plenty of money to pay for public services but wastes it on unnecessary 
programs.  We can fix the problem by cutting waste and inefficiency in government. 
 Illinois’ budget problem is so large it can only be solved by a combination of budget cuts 
and revenue increases”  
 
 
 
 
                                                                    
4 The exact amount has been changed each year to reflect that year’s deficit.  
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Table 9. Budget Cuts, Revenues, or Both 
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Figure 6. Budget Cuts, Revenues, or Both 
 
Taking the top option first, it is evident that cutting “waste and fraud” is consistently the 
most popular answer given by a majority or near majority in every one of our polls taken over 
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the past decade (see Table 9 and Figure 6).  To the extent that there is any variance, it is in the 
narrow range, from a low of 42 percent in 2015 up to 57 percent in 2009 and 2010.   
The second most popular option recommends combining both new revenue with some 
cuts in programs and services.  It ranges from a low of 27 percent in 2009 and 2010 up to highs 
of 34 percent in 2015 and up to 35 percent in 2017.  At that point one might have concluded that 
the “both” option had gained ground and might even take over the lead given the gridlock and 
budgetary crisis that had taken over in 2016 and 2017.  However, the deeply engrained “waste 
and fraud” solution was supported by majority levels in 2018 and 2019, and the “both” option 
sank to 28 percent. 
Needless to say, the “revenue only” fix had only anemic support throughout the entire 
decade.  The range was from a low of 9 percent in 2010 and 7 percent in 2011 and 2013 up to 11 
percent in 2017 and 10 percent in both 2018 and 2019.  This was the challenge facing Pritzker’s 
incoming administration as they tried to fashion a realistic and comprehensive plan to build the 
FY2020 budget and prepare for the development and selling of Pritzker’s aggressive plan for 
amending the Illinois Constitution and bringing a fundamental change to the revenue system by 
switching from a flat tax to a progressive income tax by 2021.  Taken together, this was a very 
ambitious agenda to present the General Assembly at the start of the governor’s first term.   
From the results of this table we can see that those public officials, interest groups and 
opinion leaders who repeatedly tell the voters that budgetary problems are not complicated, and 
are easy to solve have won the battle of public opinion.  In seven of our polls more than a 
majority of Illinois voters indicated their belief that all we have to do is to cut “waste and fraud”.  
When that easy answer declines, it does so only marginally into the forty percent and above level 
in six of our thirteen polls.   
The purveyors of this narrative probably have an inherent advantage in this argument 
since the distrust and even hatred of taxes is a bedrock component of the American political 
culture.  After all, those patriots in the Boston Harbor, who rebelled against King George’s taxes, 
helped ignite the American Revolution.  Their rallying cry was persuasive then and is such an 
intrinsic component of our heritage that even today the District of Columbia car tags all have the 
slogan emblazoned on them “No Taxation Without Representation” as a symbolic part of their 
appeal for statehood.  In addition, the modern “Tea Party,” which has become one of the 
dominant parts of the Republican coalition adopted that name from the first Tea Party of 
revolutionary times.   
Nevertheless, even knowing all this history, it is still somewhat surprising just how 
popular the “waste and fraud” opinion is and how persistent it has been across a full decade of 
Illinois history.  Its popularity has held steady even in face of the recurring budgetary crisis and 
as the consequences of state’s refusal to pay its bills in a timely fashion played out.  Virtually 
everyone who talks or writes about the Illinois budget starts with the underfunded pension 
system, which has reached well above $100 billion in unfunded liabilities.  Those on the right 
and the left both acknowledge the growing pension debt, but no political leader has been able to 
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assemble a working coalition to do something about it, and all the potential solutions founder on 
the shoals of public indifference and political gridlock.   
It should not be surprising to learn that these views of the tax and revenue system and 
what to do about the state’s chronic deficit are systematically related to party identification as the 
results in Table 10 demonstrate.  It is a bedrock tenet of Republican orthodoxy to advocate for 
low taxes. Every candidate who runs as a Republican seems to subscribe to this orthodoxy.  It is 
no accident that President Trump’s most important legislative victory in his first term was the 
2017 Republican federal tax cut.  The reductions were supported by every member of their 
caucus. 
 
Table 10. Budget deficit by Political Party 
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Cuts 
Total  57  57  58  55  52  43  42  47  44 45 51 45 52 
Democrats  49  49  42  44  43  35  35  36  32 34 39 36 36 
Republicans  69  68  75  70  63  55  51  60  61 60 70 62 70 
Independents  56  53  68  58  57  46  47  50  44 45 53 42 54 
Both 
Total  27  27  29  29  29  32  34  33  33 35 28 26 28 
Democrats  30  30  37  36  33  35  37  36  38 38 31 29 35 
Republicans  24  23  19  22  25  28  35  32  27 29 22 20 22 
Independents  28  32  24  26  25  36  27  34  41 39 34 35 25 
Revenues 
Total  10  9  7  8  10  16  14  10  12 11 10 12 10 
Democrats  14  14  12  11  14  18  18  16  17 18 17 18 17 
Republicans  4  4  2  2  7  14  9  4  6 4 2 4 2 
Independents  10  9  3  7  6  12  14  9  4 7 5 5 10 
Haven’t 
thought 
Total  3  3  3  5  5  5  3  4  5 4 6 6 4 
Democrats  4  4  4  5  7  6  4  5  6 4 8 6 5 
Republicans  2  2  2  3  3  1  3  3  2 4 3 6 3 
Independents  3  2  2  2  5  4  3  4  4 2 3 6 3 
Other/DK 
Total  2  4  4  5  4  4  6  6  6 6 5 11 6 
Democrats  2  3  5  1  3  6  6  7  6 6 5 11 6 
Republicans  1  3  2  3  4  1  3  2  4 4 3 8 3 
Independents  2  4  3  7  6  4  10  3  8 7 5 12 7 
 
Trump’s advocacy for the tax cuts was welcomed by House Speaker Paul Ryan and 
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, who had wanted tax cuts, particularly in the top 
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marginal rate and in capital gains for at least a decade.  Trump’s triumph was similar in direction 
and scope to the signature victory that George W. Bush achieved when he came into office in 
January of 2001 and achieved a major tax cut almost immediately.  The campaign of 2000 had 
featured a debate between Bush who wanted to cut taxes to reduce the budgetary surplus, the 
first in modern history, which had been achieved in the last three years of Bill Clinton’ 
presidency, versus Clinton’s Vice President, Al Gore, who said he wanted to use the surplus to 
create a permanent solution for some of the long-term problems of the Social Security and 
Medicare systems and then use some of the rest on infrastructure improvements.  Bush won, and 
Gore’s revenue plan lost and Bush and the Congress quickly cut taxes.  The federal deficit 
returned immediately, and it has been with us since then.  In 2017 Trump’s tax cuts increased 
that deficit to over one trillion dollars in the first fiscal year after it took effect. 
So, when Bruce Rauner ran in 2014 against Pat Quinn and his 2011 income tax increase, 
he was on firm ground with the Republican base, as our results indicate so clearly.  When he then 
ran against the newly re-enacted income tax increase in 2018, and promised to balance the 
budget with the necessary cuts and no tax increase, he was again appealing quite directly to his 
party’s long-term commitment to lower taxes and to reducing taxes whenever they could 
assemble the legislative majority necessary to make those reductions.  
The Republican voters in our survey consistently supported the idea that cuts in waste 
and fraud would be sufficient for addressing the chronic structural deficit that Illinois had faced 
since the start of the 21st century (see Table 10 and Figure 7).  That support started well above 
two thirds in 2009 and 2010, and then increased to 75% in 2011, 70% in 2013 and 63% in 2014.  
It declined to 55% in 2015 and increased to 60% in 2016 and 2017 and then increased to 70% in 
our most recent poll.  Obviously no Republican legislator was likely to suffer much backlash 
from the party base if the legislator took this rhetorical route out of being held responsible for his 
or her vote on the need to increase revenue to solve the state’s very real budgetary problems.   
Our data in Table 10 indicate that Democrats are also not immune to the siren call of 
cutting “waste and fraud” as the simple and easy solution to an intricate problem.  They are just 
not as overwhelmingly convinced of the efficacy of that solution as the Republicans are.  In 
Table 10 we see that Democrats who favor this solution were 49 percent, almost the majority, in 
2009 and 2010.  Then it dropped into the low forties during the interim between 2011 and 2014.  
Interestingly, the level of support for the “waste and fraud” argument then declined again to 35 
percent in our second poll in the fall of 2014, and it has remained in the thirties for the 
Democrats in each poll since.  So, approximately one-third of the Democratic voters in Illinois 
believe the simple and painless solution would somehow solve what has been an intractable 
problem for the first two decades of the 21st Century. 
As usual, the Independents fall somewhere between the two partisan groups.  They 
started at 56 percent in 2009, lower than the Republicans but higher than the Democrats, and 
then climbed to 68 percent in 2012, 58 percent in 2013 and 57 percent in the spring of 2014, only 
to decline to the upper forties in the fall of 2014 and the spring of 2015 and 50 percent in 2016.  
Between 2017 and 2019 the Independents affinity for this option increased from 45 percent in 
2017 to 54 percent in our most recent poll in the spring of 2019.  
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Figure 7. Budget Deficit by Political Party 
This last measurement probably reflects the reaction of the majority of Independents to 
the fact that the Illinois individual income tax had been returned to a 4.95 percent flat rate in July 
of 2017.  That also may partially account for the resurgence of the Republicans choice of that 
option in 2019 (70 percent).   
The old aphorism holds that “death and taxes” are our inevitable lot in life. While that 
may be true, people can argue endlessly over what to do about them, how to prolong life and 
avoid as many taxes as possible.  This is what Americans do, and the voters of Illinois are 
certainly no exception.  The solution at the national level has been to run regular deficits in each 
year’s budget and embrace a total national debt that continues to grow and now reaches above 21 
trillion dollars. The federal budget has not been balanced, or in the black, since Clinton’s second 
term, and the American public routinely endorses the endemic use of red ink and periodic cutting 
of taxes by their votes for president and congress.  
The annual ritual of raising the debt ceiling, and the occasional shut down of the 
government over an impasse in recognizing the inevitable necessity of increasing that debt 
ceiling is just the symbolic disagreement of the two parties over the causes of the problem and 
most desired solutions.  If tax cuts exacerbate the deficit problem, they are so desirable that the 
deficit and accumulated debt can be ignored in the interest of adding what President Trump 
called “rocket fuel” to an already healthy economy in order to increase income and ensure the 
decline of the unemployment rate, at least until the next election.  
 As Vanderbilt political scientist Larry Bartels’ definitive research shows, the 
management of taxes and the ignoring the deficit considerations have significant electoral 
benefits (Bartels, 2008).  Politicians of both parties have learned the advantages of managing 
those benefits. 
 At the state level, it is not so simple, as both former governors Pat Quinn and Bruce 
Rauner discovered.  This is because a state cannot run a deficit indefinitely, and if they cut taxes 
and the revenues available there are dire consequences, which are evident quickly.  Among the 
most prominent are the rating agencies in New York which will continue to reduce the state’s 
bond ratings until they reach, or almost reach, the “junk bond” stage which happened to Illinois 
during both Quinn’s and Rauner’s administrations.  Illinois ran that political and fiscal 
experiment in the 2015-2017 era, and the results and chain of causation were immediate and 
should have been clear for all to see.  All of the thorny issues surrounding these budgetary cross-
pressures and their inability to solve them is one of the major reasons both are former governors.   
J. B. Pritzker is trying desperately to avoid that fate now, although the jury is still out on 
whether his ambitious revenue plans, especially the progressive income tax plan, will succeed.  
Our poll results indicate that the people of Illinois have not yet been completely convinced.  That 
is what civic education and the public dialogue in a democracy are supposed to be all about, and 
our results indicate that we have failed in living up to that public education requirement.   
Consequently, our political systems, at both the national and state levels, have not been 
functioning effectively in this era of profound political polarization—especially in the realm of 
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taxation and budgeting.  The results have been gridlock on the fundamental questions facing both 
the U. S. and the state of Illinois, a gridlock that has produced periodic governmental shut-downs 
and a toxic political environment at both levels. When it comes to the essential questions of how 
to pay for the basic requirements of “providing for the common defense and promoting the 
general welfare,” Illinois politicians have failed to deliver.  
5.3.1 Potential Program Cuts 
Exploring the opinions of the Illinois voters on budgeting and taxation has been a long-term 
commitment of the Simon Poll since its beginning.  The issues surrounding budgets became even 
more insistent during the decade we have devoted to exploring this subject and documenting the 
views of the voters of Illinois.  This period included the adoption of a temporary increase to the 
state’s income tax, which was followed by a reduction almost back to its earlier levels which 
then led to a budget crisis and the governmental stalemate that resulted in no budget being 
adopted by the General Assembly for two years.   
As was recounted earlier, the stalemate was broken only when the legislature overrode 
the governor’s veto and adopted a budget for FY2018.  The story continued as the budget and 
taxes became prominent issues in the 2018 campaign and the winner, J. B. Pritzker, ran on a 
platform of replacing the whole system with a graduated income tax - that issue will be on the 
ballot for 2020.  Thus, these issues of revenues and expenditures are guaranteed to remain at the 
top of the state’s political agenda as we go into the 2020 election season. 
The next set of questions asks respondents to consider some of the hard choices that 
would be presented if the state were to make the kinds of cuts necessary to balance the state 
budget without new revenue. We have already discovered that most voters most years insist that 
they favor cuts, and that the cuts can essentially be painless by just cutting “waste and fraud.”  
Believing in and wishing for painless cuts does not make it so.  Those who understand the long-
term structural deficits that Illinois has run for decades realize the serious delusion embedded in 
that pie-in-the-sky belief, which is all too often propagated by elected office holders in Illinois 
and the interest groups that help them win and stay in office. 
  During the spring of 2019 Governor Pritzker warned that if new revenue were not found, 
the state would have to take a 15 percent across the board cut in its programs, departments, and 
agencies, and that the reductions would be devastating to the fundamental programs the state 
supports. During the debate in the State Senate on May 1, 2019, Democrats warned that higher 
education in Illinois would again face serious and significant budget cuts if the Pritzker 
Administration’s plans for new revenue over the next two years, and later his graduated income 
tax were not adopted (Hancock, May 2, 2019, 1).   
Our polls have consistently explored this very issue by asking voters’ opinions on 
programs that spend the biggest share of the state’s general fund.  The items we included are 
some of the most expensive and most prominent services the state provides to its people on a 
routine and daily basis. 
The question was phrased as follows:   
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“There have been a number of proposals to address the state’s budget problems by making cuts 
in state programs and services.  I’m going to read several areas where people have suggested 
that the state could make cuts.  For each one that I read, I’d like you to tell me whether you favor 
or oppose budget cuts in that area.”   
From the results in Table 11 and Figure 8 it is pretty clear that, in general, program cuts 
are not a popular alternative in Illinois.  There is not majority support for cutting any of the 
program alternatives we offered.  The only options that garnered much support were cuts to the 
public pension systems, cuts to state spending on natural resources, such as state parks or 
environmental regulation, and cuts to the universities.  On those the gap between support for and 
opposition to cuts was fairly close; however, even then more respondents opposed than 
supported such reductions.   
 
Table 11. Favor Proposed Cuts 
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To state spending on pension benefits for state 
workers' retirement  22  42  46  46  41  44  49  45 44 
To state spending on natural resources, such as 
state parks or environmental regulation  19  33  40  37  31  35  38  33 29 
To state spending on state universities  21  34  34  38  37  36  35  30 38 
To public safety, such as state police and prison 
operations  13  17  21  21  24  27  26  25 26 
To state spending on programs for poor people  
21  21  25  25  26  23  25  21 25 
To state spending on K-12 education  12  13  14  17  18  16  17  15 18 
To state spending on programs for people with 
mental or physical disabilities  N/A  12  12  12  15  13  15  11 13 
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Figure 8. Favor Proposed Cuts 
As members of university faculties who also have a stake in the State University 
Retirement System (SURS), two of the authors of this study are pained by these results; 
however, in both cases these results indicate that both the state’s universities and its public 
employee retirement systems have some work to do in trying to increase public support and 
explaining persuasively why both universities and public pension systems are important to the 
future of the state.  
The state pension plans, especially, have taken a beating in the past decade of budget 
wars as the state often failed to fully fund the annual costs which caused the deficit to increase 
each year the state failed to meet its obligations. For the universities the results of the budget 
wars were particularly painful, as they had already suffered from significant base budget 
decreases since 2000 and the cuts were especially deep in the two years without a state budget.  
Although Governor Pritzker proposed and the General Assembly approved a 5 percent increase 
to the base for FY2020, the result would still leave the universities at 96.4 percent of their 2015 
base after the new funds were provided.  However even for those two functions, most of the 
state’s voters consistently opposed cutting them in all the years of our polling.  
In the case of natural resources and state parks, the results also indicate that a significant 
share of the public, although not a majority, are willing to see cuts there. This should be 
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troublesome for the Illinois Department of Natural Resources; the record will show that IDNR 
has already suffered from continuous cuts over the past decade, which have led to significant 
reductions in programs and personnel.  It is notable that the reduction to only 29 percent in those 
who would favor seeing their budget cut is the lowest since our initial poll when only 19 percent 
favored them being cut.  It is likely that the well-publicized cases of the state parks being closed 
frequently, or subject to reduced hours and services, and all too evident examples of reduced 
maintenance have made an impact on the opinions of the general public regarding this generally 
popular service.    
Overwhelming majorities of Illinois voters wanted, by a wide margin, to spare the other 
state programs we tested from future budget reductions.  Illinois voters almost universally want 
elementary and secondary education, for example, protected against proposed budget cuts.  
Those who favor cuts in K-12 are in the teens in all our polls, and those who opposed them 
exceed 80 percent of our respondents in almost all the polls.   
These results should be gratifying for those who work in elementary and secondary 
public education.  Note that the 2008-2015 polls were conducted before the most recent 
budgetary crisis, which resulted in many state programs having their budgets reduced, jobs lost 
and programs closed or greatly reduced.  That which was only a hypothetical exercise earlier 
became a stark reality in 2015, 2016, and 2017.  Yet there was very little real movement in the 
public’s opinion regarding which programs were the most and least supported and the levels of 
support they received.  Starting in 2009 and extending to the latest poll in the spring of 2019 the 
level of consistency in the public’s attitudes toward these programs and the option of cutting 
them was remarkably consistent.   
Overall the results for this series of questions demonstrates very graphically the enduring 
consistency of public opinion in many issue areas.  In fact, continuity is much more often the 
dominant quality of public opinion as opposed to change, particularly and especially dramatic 
change.  Most of the time it takes a very high-profile event, or series of calamities, or a new and 
charismatic personality coming to the stage to make a lasting difference in the great tide of 
public opinion in this country or in Illinois, as our data predominantly indicate.    
Other areas in which we asked about cuts could loosely be called social programs.  We 
asked about reductions in programs for poor people and the disabled, and the results in Table 11 
show that these programs are highly favored.  In general only 20 to 25 percent of the respondents 
chose these programs for potential cuts in the decade covered by our polls.   
We were surprised initially by these findings, since one could get the idea from much of 
today’s political rhetoric that social programs are out of favor and opposed by many voters who 
think of them as coddling and corrupting people who are not working and who are undeserving 
of public assistance.  The current movement, led by Arkansas and Kentucky, requiring recipients 
of basic Medicaid benefits to prove repeatedly that they are working, in school, or looking for 
work is just the most recent indicator of a major strand American political thought.  These 
results, on the contrary, point to Illinois being a state with predominantly liberal, or at least non-
judgmental, opinions on issues related to social welfare.   
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Based on past research and the power of partisanship and ideology as explanatory 
variables, we would expect that conservatives and Republicans are more likely to favor budget 
cuts in specific areas, and liberals and Democrats are more likely to oppose them.  Also, 
Independents and moderates should be found somewhere in-between.   
 
Table 12. Cuts to Pension Benefits for State Workers’ Retirement by Political 
Party. 
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Total  22  42  46  46  41  44  49  45 44 
Democrats  20  30  33  31  34  35  41  34 33 
Republicans  24  56  58  64  55  58  62  59 61 
Independents  27  46  54  51  43  53  53  41 43 
Oppose 
 
Total  67  56  47  48  51  49  44  49 51 
Democrats  71  69  60  63  59  58  53  61 64 
Republicans  64  43  35  32  39  38  32  36 34 
Independents  65  52  38  40  46  41  37  44 52 
Don’t know 
Total  11  1  7  7  7  7  7  6 5 
Democrats  10  1  7  6  7  8  7  5 3 
Republicans  13  1  6  4  6  4  6  5 5 
Independents  8  2  8  9  11  6  9  15 5 
 
 
Table 13. Cuts to Natural Resources (Such as State Parks or Environmental 
Regulation) by Political Party 
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Favor 
Total  19  33  40  37  31  35  38  33 29 
Democrats  15  21  33  27  24  28  29  22 19 
Republicans  25  51  49  51  45  46  51  47 42 
Independents  19  33  41  42  27  39  39  29 26 
Oppose 
 
Total  76  65  53  56  61  59  57  63 68 
Democrats  82  78  61  68  70  67  66  75 78 
Republicans  68  48  45  41  48  48  44  48 55 
Independents  79  65  50  51  65  53  58  62 67 
Don’t know 
Total  5  2  7  8  7  6  5  5 3 
Democrats  3  1  6  6  6  5  5  4 3 
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Republicans  7  1  6  8  7  5  4  5 2 
Independents  2  2  9  7  8  8  3  9 7 
Table 14. Cuts to State Universities by Political Party 
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Favor 
Total  21  34  34  38  37  36  35  30 38 
Democrats  19  21  25  26  28  24  23  15 26 
Republicans  27  45  46  54  50  37  51  47 55 
Independents  19  39  37  42  38  29  35  29 37 
Oppose 
 
Total  72  64  57  54  57  56  59  67 58 
Democrats  77  78  68  69  68  72  71  83 72 
Republicans  66  53  43  38  43  51  44  48 40 
Independents  69  61  54  49  51  60  58  65 58 
Don’t know 
Total  7  1  9  8  7  8  6  3 4 
Democrats  5  1  7  6  4  7  6  2 3 
Republicans  7  2  11  8  7  7  5  4 5 
Independents  13  0  9  9  11  10  7  6 5 
 
 
 
Table 15. Cuts to Public Safety (Such as State Police and Prisons) by Political 
Party 
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Favor 
Total  13  17  21  21  24  27  26  25 26 
Democrats  14  16  21  20  24  30  28  28 30 
Republicans  13  15  23  23  23  22  23  19 22 
Independents  15  19  20  18  33  24  28  26 23 
Oppose 
 
Total  81  82  75  74  71  67  68  70 71 
Democrats  82  84  75  76  73  66  66  67 66 
Republicans  84  83  73  70  72  74  74  78 76 
Independents  79  80  74  78  59  63  66  62 71 
Don’t know 
Total  5  1  5  6  7  7  6  5 4 
Democrats  4  0  4  4  3  4  6  5 5 
Republicans  3  2  4  7  5  5  3  2 2 
Independents  6  1  5  4  8  13  5  11 6 
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Table 16. Cuts to Programs for Poor People by Political Party 
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Favor 
Total  21  21  25  25  26  23  25  21 25 
Democrats  13  10  14  14  15  14  17  13 13 
Republicans  33  39  40  41  42  39  38  34 43 
Independents  27  22  22  29  32  18  20  14 20 
Oppose 
 
Total  74  75  66  65  65  69  66  72 70 
Democrats  85  89  81  80  80  82  78  84 86 
Republicans  59  55  48  47  47  51  50  56 50 
Independents  63  74  68  57  56  69  68  78 73 
Don’t know 
Total  5  4  9  10  9  8  9  6 5 
Democrats  2  1  5  5  5  4  4  3 1 
Republicans  8  6  12  12  11  10  12  9 7 
Independents  10  4  10  14  13  14  12  9 8 
 
 
 
Table 17. Cuts to K-12 Education by Political Party 
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Total  12  13  14  17  18  16  17  15 18 
Democrats  6  8  7  9  10  11  12  8 10 
Republicans  20  17  22  26  29  22  22  22 31 
Independents  17  14  15  21  21  16  20  15 13 
Oppose 
 
Total  86  86  82  80  79  81  79  82 80 
Democrats  93  92  91  90  89  87  86  90 90 
Republicans  78  81  71  70  67  75  72  74 65 
Independents  85  86  81  76  73  80  77  79 82 
Don’t know 
Total  2  1  4  4  3  3  4  3 2 
Democrats  1  0  1  2  1  2  2  2 1 
Republicans  3  2  7  4  5  3  6  4 4 
Independents  2  0  4  4  6  4  3  6 5 
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Table 18. Cuts to programs for people with Mental or Physical Disabilities by 
Political Party 
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Total  12  12  12  15  13  15  11 13 
Democrats  8  9  10  10  10  13  10 9 
Republicans  14  17  15  21  16  17  12 17 
Independents  12  14  13  17  15  14  9 14 
Oppose 
 
Total  87  83  84  82  83  81  86 85 
Democrats  91  89  88  88  88  84  89 90 
Republicans  84  77  79  75  80  80  83 80 
Independents  86  81  83  79  80  80  86 82 
Don’t know 
Total  1  4  4  3  4  4  3 2 
Democrats  0  2  2  2  2  2  1 1 
Republicans  2  6  6  4  4  3  5 3 
Independents  1  5  4  3  5  6  4 3 
 
In general, those expectations were supported by the data. Conservatives and Republicans 
were especially more likely to support cuts to the public pension systems, universities and to 
natural resources programs, for example. In our two most recent polls, one taken during the 
budgetary crisis and the other taken after it had been addressed with a new budget, the 
differences between the more hawkish Republicans and the more cuts-averse Democrats was in 
the range of twenty points and seems to have increased. There is a partisan gap of 25 points on 
cuts to public pensions in 2017 and 28 points in 2019.  The gap on the universities was 32 points 
in 2017, and 29 points in 2019.  On natural resources, the gap was 25 and 23 points respectively 
in 2017 and 2019.   
The partisan differences have been quite salient across the span of all our polls, and those 
differences seem to have increased in the most recent iteration.  These results graphically depict 
the increasing depths of partisan polarization on important public policy matters.  This 
polarization is making it increasingly difficult to make effective policy and to mount any kind of 
effective attack on the problems which confront us at the end of the second decade of the 21st 
Century.   
5.3.2 Other Revenue Alternatives 
The next section probes public opinion on alternative revenue sources to address the Illinois 
budget crisis.  As noted above, at the beginning of FY2011 the income tax was raised on 
individuals and corporations.  It was allowed to expire on January 1, 2015.  The budget shortfall 
exploded, and many people immediately started talking about the real need for new revenue.   
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In 2017 the income tax increase that had been allowed to expire was essentially restored 
to 4.95 on personal income and to 7.95 on corporations.  This action was taken by the Democrats 
who controlled the General Assembly when they overrode Governor Rauner’s veto of the 
budget, and this override was accomplished with ten votes from the Republicans.  This increase 
was hotly debated and became the fodder for Governor Rauner’s campaign in 2018 and for many 
other legislative races where most Republicans roundly denounced the increase and many 
Democrats tried to avoid the blame.  Even though J. B. Pritzker won the governor’s race handily 
in November 2018 and the Democrats expanded their majorities in the House and Senate, the 
debate over taxes, and now Pritzker’s plan for a graduated income tax, reflect echoes of the 
earlier debate and will set the stage for the legislative races in 2020 and for the next governor’s 
race in 2022. Those 2020 legislative races are shaping up now.   
Part of that debate over revenue and expenditures and the necessity of addressing the 
structural deficit has included the question of specific new sources of revenue. The budget 
shortfall is immediate and must be dealt with in the Fiscal Year 2020 and 2021 budgets, since the 
proposed constitutional amendment cannot take effect until 2021 at the earliest.  We have 
continued to ask our series of questions about proposed new sources of revenue.  Table 19 
provides the views of the Illinois voters through the spring 2019 poll.   
 
Table 19. Favor Proposed Revenue Sources5 
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Millionaire’s tax  -  -  -  -  -  -  68  76  75  78 76 74 71 
Graduated income tax  65  -  -  -  -  -  -  66  66  72 72 67 67 
Tax retirement income over 
$50k  -  -  -  43  -  53  -  56  54  55 52 43 59 
Expand gambling  42  47  50  57  50  53  -  53  50  55 49 51 57 
Tax services  28  45  42  50  37  44  -  49  45  36 39 36 36 
Raise gas tax  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  26  41  42 42 35 37 
Tax retirement income     -  -  -  21  -  22  -  24  22  23 22 21 23 
Raise sales tax  22  22  25  22  -  18  -  -  -  - - - - 
 
                                                                    
5 Note: the exact wording of the questions on services changed slightly in 2016; the wording on the taxing of 
retirement income changed from $50k to $100k after 2016; and the question on the millionaires tax in 2014b added 
“…to provide additional funds to public schools”, and the gas tax question in 2015 listed a specific amount of 10 
cents. Otherwise the questions have remained consistent across the polls.    
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Figure 9. Favor Proposed Revenue Sources 
5.3.2.1 Gambling 
Support for expanded gambling in Illinois started at 42 percent and 47 percent respectively in our 
first two polls taken in 2008 and 2009.  Then it increased to 50 percent and 57 percent in the next 
two years. In the nine years since 2010, support has been above a majority with the lone 
exception of 49 percent in 2018.  In fact, the 57 percent in 2019 was the highest level this item 
has garnered since 2011.   
It may be that at some level most Illinois voters have accepted the proposition that some 
new revenue is needed, or at the least, that if the revenue increases are virtually inevitable, then 
expanding gambling is one of the least objectionable sources.  Gambling is all around us, almost 
no matter where one lives in the U. S. today, and it has been ubiquitous in neighboring states 
since they first introduced river boat gambling on the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers.  
Legislators across the nation are notorious for turning to so-called “sin taxes” on 
gambling, cigarettes and liquor to raise new revenue.  No one has ever lost an election based on a 
vote for increasing the sin taxes.   
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Table 20. Expand Gambling by Political Party 
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Favor 
Total  42  47  50  57  50  53  53  50  55 49 51 57 
Democrats  45  48  53  60  55  58  54  51  54 52 52 59 
Republicans  41  36  48  53  45  47  50  50  54 47 51 57 
Independents  44  51  51  59  42  56  54  47  55 48 48 54 
Oppose 
 
Total  52  53  46  39  44  44  43  46  41 46 42 40 
Democrats  51  51  43  36  40  40  42  44  42 44 39 38 
Republicans  52  64  50  43  50  50  46  47  43 49 46 41 
Independents  50  48  43  37  53  38  41  52  38 44 46 43 
Don’t know 
 
 
 
Total  6  0  4  4  6  4  5  4  4 6 7 3 
Democrats  4  1  4  4  6  2  4  5  4 4 8 3 
Republicans  6  0  2  4  5  3  3  4  2 4 3 2 
Independents  6  0  6  4  5  6  4  1  8 8 6 3 
 
Figure 10. Expand Gambling by Political Party (Favor) 
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The City of Chicago has long wanted at least one casino.  They point out with some logic 
that it seems unfair that the largest city in the state by far is denied a casino when a much smaller 
place like Metropolis, in the deep southern tip of the state, has had a casino for decades. 
Legislators from the Chicago area have took the lead in the most recent drive for expanding 
gambling and, with the assistance of Governor J. B. Pritzker, this became one of the most likely 
sources for new revenues. The General Assembly approved it at the end of the spring term. 
Of course, gambling is not free.  Numerous social costs are borne by those who are 
addicted, and by their families, employers, and the general public, but those costs are rarely felt 
directly by the public.  Further, the direct costs to the individual gamblers tend to fall 
disproportionately on lower socio-economic groups and people who are not politically powerful.   
Over the eleven years we have asked about gambling expansion, opinion on the subject 
has bounced up and down, but Democrats, on average, have been more likely to support the idea 
(see Table 20 and Figure 10).  Since 2015, support from both partisan groups has been at 50 
percent or above, with the one exception of 2018, when it was 47 percent among Republicans.  
Then, in our most recent poll in 2019, Democrats were at 59 percent and Republicans were at 57 
percent, near the highest level ever for either group.  Independents lagged, slightly, at 54 percent.  
Expanding gambling, and presumably the state revenues gained from it, appeared to be one of 
those proposals whose time had come in the revenue-starved Illinois early in J. B. Pritzker’s new 
administration. The proposal passed in the final week of the session providing a very substantial 
expansion of gambling in Illinois and hopes for significant new state revenue.   
5.3.2.2 Increasing the State Sales Tax 
One plausible option discussed periodically is increasing the state sales tax.  The sales tax at state 
and local levels is often turned to, and it can be a popular alternative for legislators when the 
state is in dire need of new revenues.  It is placed on widely used goods and services, and the 
burdens are shared by all consumers.  It has the further advantage of seeming to be fairly 
innocuous, almost invisible on the minor sales transactions of daily life. At the check-out counter 
consumers presumably just consider the total as the cost of the item and pay little attention to the 
added tax. Thus, when legislators are pushed into a corner and must increase revenues, they 
frequently turn to the sales tax. 
However, simply increasing the state sales tax is not particularly popular in Illinois.  The 
basic state sales tax is 5.0 percent plus 1.25 percent collected by the state and returned to local 
governments (1.0 percent to cities and 0.25 percent to the counties), making the base total 6.25 
percent.  In addition, local governments can add another increment to the 6.25 percent (under 
some fairly stringent limits).  When the local overlay of sales tax is taken into account the overall 
sales tax rate can reach 8 to 11 percent range in some jurisdictions.  This has not been, then, a 
popular option for state legislators and governors recently in Illinois.   
Our polls also show limited overall support among voters. In fact, it was the least popular 
revenue-raising proposal from 2008 to 2010, when we first included it in our polls (see Table 
21). Opposition stood near or above three-quarters across the time period we covered. 
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Table 21. Raise Sales Tax by Political Party 
%. 
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Favor 
Total  22  22  25  22  18  
Democrats  25  19  27  25  23  
Republicans  16  19  20  20  12  
Independents  23  28  32  20  29  
Oppose 
 
Total  74  77  73  74  79  
Democrats  70  80  71  71  73  
Republicans  83  81  77  78  86  
Independents  69  72  66  77  70  
Don’t know 
Total  4  1  3  4  3  
Democrats  5  1  2  4  3  
Republicans  1  1  3  2  3  
Independents  8  0  3  3  2  
 
In addition, there was such opposition that the partisan differences were slight, although 
Democrats were somewhat more supportive of the idea than Republicans most years.  While 
Democrats were somewhat more likely than Republicans to support the idea, their favorability 
toward increasing the sales tax never reached three in ten, peaking at 27 percent in 2010.  
Opposition from the Republicans was well above 70 percent two years and above 80 percent in 
three of the five years.   
The Simon Poll results show that attitudes toward increasing the sales tax were relatively 
stable over time and support for raising it remained low.  This is one of the reasons we did not 
include it in several of our subsequent polls and have not included it at all since 2014.  If it 
becomes a feasible option and a part of the public dialogue in Illinois, we will consider adding it 
again.   
5.3.2.3 Expanding the Categories of Services 
Expanding the sales tax base to include a much wider array of services is an idea that comes and 
goes, and occasionally comes back again, among the civic groups, think-tanks, pundits, and 
opinion leaders who grapple with the hard questions of where Illinois can get more money to 
support the government services its citizens, by their votes and actions, agree the state needs.  
Experts on this matter frequently point out that our sales tax system was constructed in the era 
when manufacturing and agriculture dominated our economy (Civic Federation, February 13, 
2019).     
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Table 22. Tax Services by Political Party 
%. 
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Total  28  45  42  50  37  44  49  45  36 39 36 36 
Democrats  32  52  43  56  48  51  50  52  45 45 40 47 
Republicans  22  41  34  42  24  37  51  38  28 32 29 30 
Independents  27  44  43  54  33  43  46  43  30 36 43 29 
Oppose 
 
Total  69  54  53  45  60  53  46  52  60 58 58 61 
Democrats  66  48  46  40  50  47  45  44  52 52 56 50 
Republicans  74  59  60  54  73  60  47  60  70 65 67 66 
Independents  71  56  52  44  47  54  51  52  64 59 51 67 
Don’t know 
Total  3  0  1  4  3  3  4  4  4 3 6 3 
Democrats  2  0  5  3  2  2  5  4  3 3 4 2 
Republicans  3  0  6  4  3  3  3  2  2 2 4 4 
Independents  6  0  5  3  2  3  3  5  6 4 6 5 
 
Today, services and technology dominate.  There are only 17 basic categories of services 
taxed today in Illinois, even though there are 168 service categories taxed somewhere in the U.S. 
The average per state is 56, so Illinois clearly has a very narrow base to its service tax. We have 
changed the wording marginally some years to reflect various proposals being considered.  Most 
recently we compared Illinois to our neighbor, Wisconsin, which taxes more services.  Our polls 
have consistently shown some support for this idea. It started at only 28 percent in 2008, and 
then went to 45 percent and 42 percent in the next two years.  It reached its high-water mark at 
50 percent in 2011, then sank to 37 percent and the mid-forties for the years up until 2016.  It 
then dropped down by a noticeable amount into the thirties starting in 2017 and extending 
through the most recent poll in 2019 at 36 percent.  This most recent sag in public support may 
be a reaction to the re-established income tax increase which came in 2017.   
The differences on expanding the range of services taxed materialize in predictable ways.  
That is, overall the Democrats are a good deal more in favor of this idea and the Republicans 
more opposed with the Independents in between but leaning a bit more toward the Democrats.   
Governor Bruce Rauner discussed this alternative in his first run for the governor’s office 
in 2014; however, he abandoned it after he got elected.  J. B. Pritzker discussed the possibility in 
at least one campaign rally in 2018; however, he also abandoned the concept as soon as the next 
day, reportedly in the wake of his campaign staff persuading him it was a loser of a proposition.  
Our data tend to indicate that the idea has appeal to public policy specialists, but not to a 
majority of voters.  There are simply no painless ways to increase taxes, even if they are the 
relatively innocuous taxes added to the retail bills we pay. Nevertheless, getting such increases 
through a legislative body, with its wide array of interest groups and lobbyists who dominate the 
American political process and who will weigh-in heavily in the public discourse if any 
The Climate of Opinion in Illinois 2008-2019: Gridlock Broken? 
 The Simon Review: Paper #56 | 56 
additional taxes threaten their business or industry even marginally, makes it very difficult to 
take the steps that budget technocrats believe to be rational, and even long over-due.   
5.3.2.4 Taxing Retirement Income 
Illinois is one of only three states that do not levy the state income tax on retirement 
income.  This is a great benefit to retirees, many of whom retired on relatively low incomes and 
who had given up some of their current pay benefits in order to get this retirement income 
exemption.  It also should make Illinois an attractive state for retirees to settle in, although the 
sometimes-harsh winters tend to mitigate that advantage somewhat.  Not surprisingly, the 
exemption for retirement income has long been contentious, and the idea of applying the state 
income tax to it has been debated often.  As we saw in Table 19, statewide support for this idea 
has been stable in a narrow range of 21 percent to 24 percent for the years we have asked the 
question. 
Table 23 shows that this unpopularity extends across all partisan categories. The 
Democrats are somewhat higher in their level of support for taxing retirement income than 
Republicans and Independents.  In our most recent poll, there was an eleven-point gap, with the 
Democrats at 29 percent and the Republicans and Independents both at only 18 percent; 
however, 67 percent of Democrats were opposed to this idea and well over three-quarters of 
Republicans and Independents opposed it most years.  Not surprisingly, then, this proposal did 
not get on Governor Pritzker’s list of possible revenue sources even though he was scouring the 
field for any potentially saleable idea of raising new revenue to attack Illinois’ structural deficit 
(Petrella, February, 13, 2019; Civic Federation, February 13, 2019).   
 
Table 23. Tax Retirement Income by Political Party 
%. 
   
2
0
1
1
  
2
0
1
4
a 
 
2
0
1
5
  
2
0
1
6
a 
 
2
0
1
7 
2
0
1
8
a 
2
0
1
8
b
 
2
0
1
9 
Favor 
Total  21  22  24  22  23 22 21 23 
Democrats  23  25  28  26  24 24 24 29 
Republicans  19  16  22  18  24 20 19 18 
Independents  23  27  16  16  17 19 21 18 
Oppose 
 
Total  73  72  70  73  72 74 72 73 
Democrats  73  69  65  68  72 72 70 67 
Republicans  77  78  73  78  70 77 77 79 
Independents  72  71  82  79  74 76 71 77 
Don’t know 
Total  5  7  6  6  6 4 7 4 
Democrats  4  6  7  6  4 4 5 4 
Republicans  4  6  6  4  5 2 4 3 
Independents  5  2  2  4  9 5 8 5 
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5.3.2.4.1 Tax Retirement Income only for Higher Income Earners 
One way to make a retirement tax more progressive in Illinois would be to exempt the 
first $50,000 or the first $100,000 of retirement income.  This would then give a tax break to low 
income retirees while forcing those with above-average retirement incomes to pay some level of 
income tax.  We started by asking about a $50,000 exemption up through 2016, and then after 
2016 we changed to a $100,000 level of exemption. Either way, the proposal has been popular 
with well over a majority of the voters with the notable exception of our fall poll of 2018 when 
only 43 percent favored it and 44 percent opposed.   
Table 24 shows the results by party.  From 2014 through the first poll in 2018, majorities 
of respondents statewide favored this plan although it was clearly more popular among 
Democrats and Independents than Republicans.  It may be that the 2019 results are an aberration 
because this proposal was caught up in the larger debate over J. B Pritzker’s graduated income 
tax proposal, which is a separate but related proposal.  It will require additional polls in the 
future to determine the fate of this concept. It will also be impacted by the 2020 referendum on 
the income tax plan advanced by Governor Pritzker.    
 
Table 24. Tax Retirement Income over $50k or $100k by Political Party 
%. 
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Total  43  53  56  54  55 52 43 59 
Democrats  50  58  61  58  63 58 50 68 
Republicans  34  46  36  50  46 44 36 51 
Independents  42  62  49  59  64 50 41 56 
Oppose 
 
Total  49  35  34  41  39 43 44 34 
Democrats  42  31  28  36  31 37 38 26 
Republicans  60  44  36  46  50 53 54 43 
Independents  50  29  44  37  33 46 46 37 
Don’t know 
Total  8  12  11  6  5 5 13 7 
Democrats  8  11  11  6  6 4 12 7 
Republicans  6  10  10  4  4 4 10 6 
Independents  8  10  7  4  2 5 13 8 
 
5.3.2.5 Graduated (or Progressive) Income Tax System 
Well before Governor Pritzker came onto the scene with his proposal for a graduated or 
progressive income tax, there was real interest in the basic idea.  This is why we included the 
question in our very first Simon Poll in 2008.  We have included it annually since 2015.  It has 
been supported by statewide majorities of well over 60 percent and most recently at or above 
three-quarters in both 2017 and 2018. In 2019, after the proposal became an integral part of 
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Pritzker’s platform 2018, and his plan took on a partisan implication, the 67 percent who 
supported it in our 2019 poll constitutes exactly two-thirds of Illinois voters.   
 Even with that level of public support, however, the plan faced an uncertain future in the 
Illinois General Assembly. After a fierce debate in the General Assembly with every Republican 
in the House and several in the Senate taking the floor to condemn the plan, it passed both 
houses with only Democratic votes and unanimous opposition from the GOP. It now faces an 
even more uncertain future when it will be placed on the 2020 general election ballot, since it 
will require a Constitutional Amendment to institute the progressive tax.   
 The 1970 Illinois Constitution spelled out a flat-rate income tax for individuals and 
corporations.  In addition, it effectively caped the corporate tax rate by requiring a ratio of not 
more than 8 to 5 between the individual rate and the corporate rate (Article 9, Sec. 3 a).  This 
was a compromise produced by the Constitutional Convention of 1969 and was meant to help 
gain popular support, most notably from business interests, in order to win the referendum on the 
new constitution.  Since then, the flat rate and the 8 to 5 ratio have been jealously guarded by 
those who like the status quo and benefit from it. Governor Pritzker also included the 8 to 5 ratio 
implicitly in his new graduated income tax plan for the 2020 ballot.  There are currently two 
major PAC’s taking the field of battle and already raising big money and taking out television 
and newspaper ads, one to support  the proposal and one to oppose it in the 2020 general 
election. .   
 
Table 25. Graduated Income Tax by Political Party 
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Favor 
Total  65  66  66  72 72 67 67 
Democrats  79  80  83  87 86 87 88 
Republicans  49  50  44  55 51 42 43 
Independents  60  65  68  71 69 57 65 
Oppose 
 
Total  29  28  28  24 24 26 31 
Democrats  16  16  12  10 11 9 10 
Republicans  46  45  51  42 44 51 55 
Independents  31  28  27  26 27 34 31 
Don’t know 
Total  5  6  6  4 4 7 2 
Democrats  4  4  4  3 3 5 1 
Republicans  5  5  5  3 4 7 2 
Independents  8  7  5  3 4 10 4 
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Figure 11. Graduated Income Tax by Political Party (Favor) 
Forty-three states have an individual income tax system.  Thirty-three of those states have 
a graduated or progressive system, and eight have a flat rate system including Illinois (Scarboro, 
2018, 1). The federal system also uses the graduated system as well so this is not a new or 
particularly radical proposal. Nevertheless, the battle will be hard-fought, and the results of the 
referendum will likely be close. 
To no one’s surprise, Democrats have been significantly more likely than Republicans to 
favor imposing a graduated Illinois income tax rate in all the polls we have taken (see Table 25 
and Figure 11).  The gap in favorability between Democrats and Republicans in the 2016 survey 
was 39 percentage points.  This gap then declined to 32 percent in 2017 and increased to 45 
percent in both 2018 and 2019. Independents also favored the graduated tax by well over a 
majority, and often by levels very close to the Democrats.  
            It is notable, on the other hand, that in our 2017 poll, most (55 percent) Republicans 
favored the graduated income tax.   This declined to 42 percent and 43 percent in 2018 and 2019.  
The intervening variable, of course, was the 2018 campaign for governor, during which J. B. 
Pritzker ran hard in support of this issue while former Governor Bruce Rauner opposed it.  If, as 
the Responsible Parties model requires, the campaign for governor constituted a referendum on 
the candidates’ platforms, Democrats should have continued to support it, and some Republicans 
would have opposed, it because of the campaign.    
           It is widely recognized in the political science literature that intense minorities can and 
often do win in the legislative arena.  Add to this equation the importance and impact of 
motivated and mobilized intense minorities, the power of well financed interest groups, and their 
highly effective lobbyists in Washington or Springfield, and it is easy to see why a simple 
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majority, even one as large as two-thirds or three-fourths of the voting population often does not 
prevail in the legislative arena.   
          This case epitomizes the age-old discussion and discrepancy between those who 
emphasize that the United States is a democracy versus those who emphasize that it is a republic, 
where political leaders, and often political and economic elites rule (Dahl, 1961; Bartels, 2008.)  
In Illinois in 2019 and 2020 we are about to run a great natural social science experiment on the 
power of public opinion in the legislative process and the ability of a clear majority to prevail in 
a representative body and then in a referendum proposal. Pritzker’s so-called “fair tax” will be 
voted on in the fall of 2020 only after tens of millions of dollars will have been spent on both 
sides to try to enshrine their preferences into the Illinois Constitution on one of the most 
important issues a state or nation can face: who benefits and who pays, and at what levels, for 
the public goods and services in the portfolios of most modern American states.   
It is nice to have majority support in trying to build a legislative coalition to create a new 
law or pass a constitutional amendment, but that is certainly not a sufficient condition, as 
Governor Pritzker will discover.  We will see whether clear majority support for a graduated 
income tax is enough to get final approval from both houses of the Illinois legislature in the face 
of almost universal opposition from Republican legislators and many powerful interest groups 
such as the Illinois Chamber of Commerce and the Illinois Manufacturers Association 
(O’Connor, May 4, 2019).  
5.3.2.6 A Tax on Million-Dollar Earners 
A variation on the graduated income tax is a plan that has been advocated for some time 
by Speaker of the House, Mike Madigan, who proposed that the state increase the income tax an 
extra three percent on those who make more than $1 million per year.  In fact, he and the 
Democrats in the General Assembly placed this question on an advisory referendum on the 
November 2014 general election ballot.  It passed handily with a 60 percent favorable vote.  It is 
notable how closely the voting results resembled the 68 percent of our statewide poll respondents 
who favored the proposal that year.  This was one instance in which majority opinion was turned 
into a voting majority, of somewhat smaller size—but it was only a non-binding referendum.  A 
constitutional amendment will be a much more difficult proposition. 
Since 2014, the popular majority in favor of “the millionaire’s’ tax” has only grown.  By 
2015 it was 76 percent and it has stayed at three-quarters of the voters, or above, until our most 
recent poll, in which support dipped to 71 percent.  This slight decline could be margin of error, 
or it could also reflect the prominence of J. B. Pritzker’s advocacy for the progressive income 
tax, with this proposal constituting a variation on the theme.  In our 2016 paper we wrote, “This 
option may come back into the mix if the state ever decides to get serious about raising 
additional revenue.”  This proved to be a good prediction as the proposal is clearly relevant to the 
current conflict over the basic Illinois tax system and the potential for fundamentally 
transforming it in 2020.   
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Table 26. Millionaire’s Tax by Political Party 
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Total  68  76  75  78 76 74 71 
Democrats  84  86  88  90 88 88 90 
Republicans  41  63  56  63 60 53 51 
Independents  66  72  77  83 72 74 69 
Oppose 
 
Total  28  21  23  19 21 21 27 
Democrats  13  11  10  8 11 9 9 
Republicans  55  34  42  33 36 41 47 
Independents  27  25  22  15 27 21 27 
Don’t know 
Total  5  3  2  3 3 5 2 
Democrats  3  2  2  2 1 3 1 
Republicans  5  3  1  3 4 6 2 
Independents  7  3  1  2 1 5 4 
 
Further evidence of the partisan differences we noted in 2019 is provided in Table 26 and 
Figure 12 which disaggregate the statewide results by party identification.  There the Republican 
identifiers are significantly less supportive of the millionaires’ tax than Democrats and 
Independent are.  Since 2014 support for this idea has grown into the upper eighties among 
Democrats and reached the spectacular level of 90 percent in the 2019 poll.  While noting that 
Republican support levels are much lower, at the same time it is evident from Table 26 that in 
2015, over six in ten Republican respondents (63 percent) favored this surcharge on the million 
dollar per year earners, and it was the same in 2017.  Then it declined to 60 percent in 2018 and 
declined to a bare majority of 51 percent in 2019, with 47 percent opposed.  
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Figure 12. Millionaire’s Tax by Political Party (Favor) 
 
 Again, we had an election for governor in November of 2018 and Pritzker and his allies 
began their campaign for the constitutional amendment in the spring of 2019.  Included in the 
governor’s graduated income tax campaign in the spring of 2019 was the specification of the 
brackets (O’Connor, May 4, 2019). Pritzker claimed that his plan would actually reduce taxes for 
97 percent of Illinois taxpayers, or all those making less than $250,000 per year.  Then those 
between $250,001 and $500,000 would see increases (in a range from 4.95 to 7.75) and for those 
making from $500,001 to one million the increase would be from 4.95 up to 7.85.   Those 
making above one million dollars per year would experience a three percent increase from 4.95 
to 7.95.  Perhaps not coincidentally, this 3 percent increase for million-dollar earners closely 
mirrors the original Madigan plan, which, again, voters approved by a 60 percent majority 
 The corporate tax rate would go from 7.0% to 7.99%.  In addition corporations have to 
pay a personal property replacement tax of 2.5%, a decade’s old compromise reached when 
Illinois did away with the requirement that corporations had to pay the personal property taxes, a 
tax which a number of other states still have.  There is some debate over whether this is simply 
the same thing as a corporate income tax by another name (Klemens, January, 2018, 10-14).  
Late in the spring session, there was added to Pritzker’s original plan some property tax relief 
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which was designed to attract more votes in the General Assembly, and more voters when the 
2020 referendum will be held.  If passed, the graduated income tax is projected by the 
administration to add $3.5 billion to the state’s revenue starting in 2021.   
5.3.2.7 A Capital Development Bill Funded by Gas Tax Increase 
J. B. Pritzker and his administration also advanced a new capital development bill to fund 
infrastructure additions and improvements.  As indicated in the introduction, this would become 
the first capital bill to pass the General Assembly since Pat Quinn’s $31 billion 2009 capital 
campaign, which he called the “Illinois Jobs Act.” That bill was paid for by a variety of new 
taxes, including video gambling, online lottery profits, sales taxes on candy and alcohol (note: 
all sin taxes) and an increase in fees for car and truck tags.  Before that, the last capital campaign 
had been in 1999 with George Ryan’s “Illinois FIRST” program, with a $12 billion price tag.  It 
was funded by increases in vehicle license tags and increased taxes on alcohol (Pearson and 
Petrella, April 28, 2019, 1-A).   
As the terminology goes, this bill provided new money for both “horizontal” projects (i.e. 
new and improved highways, streets, bridges, airports, mass transit, etc.) favored by the unions 
and the state’s contractors, and “vertical” projects (i.e. new buildings, and renovation and repairs 
to existing buildings) favored by universities, community colleges, hospitals, the Department of 
Corrections, the Department of Natural Resources, Veterans’ Affairs, etc. 
Pritzker and his administration launched the debate at the start of the spring 2019 
legislative session.  While Democrats took the lead, many Republican legislators had projects 
they wanted for their districts, and they showed a keen interest in breaking the decade-long 
legislative logjam that had stopped new capital bills in the past.  Hearings were held across the 
state with legislators from both parties in attendance, where they listened to a wide variety of 
groups and individuals who described their compelling needs for funding to repair buildings and 
highways suffering from years of deferred maintenance and plans for new buildings and 
facilities.   
The devil, however, is in the details, in this case the omnipresent detail of how to pay for 
an ambitious capital bill which has many potential beneficiaries— but who will pay and how is 
always the key question.  The most likely answer to this question for a capital bill was to 
increase the state’s tax on motor fuel.  This is the answer the federal government and most states 
use, and a number of other states have recently increased their gasoline taxes to pay for similar 
infrastructure improvements in their states.    
The Illinois tax on gasoline is currently 19 cents per gallon.  This is higher than some 
adjacent states and lower than others. The state also adds the state sales tax to the price of each 
gallon sold which is different from most other states.  Initially, there were various proposals in 
the General Assembly, some to increase by relatively small increments and at least one to double 
it to 38 cents.  One legislator even advocated an increase to 44 cents.  Other legislators wanted 
different solutions to the how to pay for the ambitious plan, but no other option seemed to garner 
the early attention focused on the gas tax because of the amount of revenue it could raise and the 
long term stability of that revenue stream.  Governor Pritzker did not reveal his preferences early 
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on in this debate, but when he did it was to endorse the 19 cent motor fuel tax increase (to 38 
cents a gallon), tax electric vehicles for the first time as well as to increase car and truck license 
fees and other smaller items.   
We started including this question in our 2015 and 2016 polls and included it in each 
subsequent year. As one can see, by 2016 there was a relatively solid level of support for this 
idea even if not a majority (see Tables 19 and 27 and Figure 13). 
 
Table 27. Raise Gas Tax by Political Party6 
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Total  26  41  42 42 35 37 
Democrats  34  47  49 50 46 50 
Republicans  18  32  35 36 25 26 
Independents  25  44  41 34 29 32 
Oppose 
 
Total  72  56  56 57 60 61 
Democrats  64  49  48 49 49 48 
Republicans  81  66  63 63 74 72 
Independents  74  53  56 64 63 66 
Don’t know 
Total  2  3  2 1 5 2 
Democrats  2  3  3 1 4 2 
Republicans  1  1  2 1 1 2 
Independents  1  3  3 1 8 2 
 
Those who favored this proposal totaled 41 percent in 2016, 42 percent in 2018, and then 
dipped to 37 percent in 2019.  In 2016 and 2017 there were 56 percent of the respondents 
opposed and in 2018 it was 57 percent opposed.  In our most recent poll, opposition had grown 
to 61 percent.  It is not at all clear what new revenue source would be appealing to those who 
oppose the gas tax increase, and generally this is also true of the state legislators who make up 
the opposition. Perhaps that is one reason the legislators, in a two-day overtime session on June 1 
and 2, cobbled together a rather significant majority, composed by almost all the Democrats, but 
also supported by twenty Republicans, to pass this far reaching capital improvements bill.  In 
order to get the necessary Republican votes, Pritzker, and the Democratic leaders of the General 
Assembly agreed to a number of business reform measures, most notably the repeal of the 
franchise tax, one which was particularly onerous to small businesses, and one which the 
Republicans had wanted to eliminate for many years. They also agreed to place all the sales tax 
                                                                    
6 In 2015 the question asked “would you favor or oppose raising the state gasoline tax by 10 cents per gallon?” 
While in 2016 the question was just asked about a general gas tax increase.   
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generated from motor fuel sales in a “lock box” to ensure that they would be used only for 
transportation projects (Miller, June 9, A11).  
 
 
Figure 13. Raise Gas Tax by Political Party (Favor) 
 
The partisan gap on a gasoline tax was 15 points between Democrats and Republicans in 
the 2016 poll, 14 points in 2017, 2018, and 24 points in 2019 with Democrats more favorable 
and Republicans more opposed. Independents were more favorable than Republicans in all cases 
except 2018, when the gap was only 2 points.  This has been the pattern across all the revenue 
questions we included.  Overall the consistency of these results indicate just how powerful party 
identification is as an influence on the views of the voters of Illinois. That pattern is also quite 
evident in the results of national polls across the past three decades as the nation has grown more 
partisan and more polarized at the mass voter level just as it has done even more starkly at the 
public official level.   
This is the end of our list of revenue options that have been offered in Springfield since 
we started the Simon Poll in 2008.  In some specific cases there is a plan for raising revenue that 
either has the support of a clear majority, and of a near majority, in others. The graduated income 
tax, “the millionaire’s tax,” and expanding gambling are the three top proposals supported by 
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marked majorities.  When we go below those top three in our tables, support sags to the 40, 30, 
and 20 percentiles, and the opposition grows accordingly.   
6 GOVERNOR J. B. PRITZKER AND THE 101ST GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
Given the constant pressure of paying off the backlog of bills and the Pritzker 
Administration looking for revenue to balance the budget, in 2019 we added the options of 
legalizing recreational marijuana and legalizing betting on sports. These proposals were 
supported by 66 percent and 63 percent respectively.  These two options were important 
components of Governor Pritzker’s plans for increasing revenue, and were keys to his potential 
for passing a balanced budget.   
All of these proposals together constituted Pritzker’s platform for his first year in office. 
He went around the state attempting to gin up support for his plan, and the General Assembly 
held numerous hearings in Springfield, Chicago, and across Illinois.  All of this public build-up 
plus Pritzker’s decision, ultimately backed by House Speaker Madigan and Senate President 
Cullerton, to compromise with House Minority Leader Jim Durkin and Senate Minority Leader 
Bill Brady over some business friendly proposals they advanced, were the keys to getting a final 
bi-partisan agreement, and significant Republican votes for both the budget bill and the capital 
bill at the end of the session.   
With the close of the General Assembly, two days late, on Sunday, June 2, 2019, the 
State of Illinois, or at least its political class, exhaled a big sigh of relief. The session had 
produced and passed an almost unprecedented collection of significant bills.  Some of these 
items, like the capital bill, had been backlogged for a decade.  The budget itself was widely 
considered to be truly balanced, without much, if any, accounting legerdemain, and it was the 
first budget of this century in which that claim could be made with much creditability. 
Governor Pritzker began the new year and the first months of his administration with an 
ambitious political agenda.  It included as his top most important items: 
(a) An increase of the $8.25 minimum wage in increments to $15 per hour by 2025  
(b) A Reproductive Health Act, which contained a number of new safeguards to a 
woman’s right to a safe and legal abortion and state protections of the Pro-Choice positions in 
Illinois if Roe v. Wade is ever overturned 
 (c) A balanced budget for FY2020 of approximately $40 billion 
 (d)  Legalization of recreational cannabis, with provisions for possible expungement of 
the criminal record for thousands of people who had previously been convicted of marijuana 
offenses, with an added investment fund targeted to minority communities disproportionately 
harmed by the war on drugs  
 (e) New gaming legislation, which included new casinos in Chicago, Waukegan, 
Rockford, Danville, the South Suburbs, and in southern Illinois at the Walker’s Bluff site  
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 (f) A new capital bill with $45 billion to be invested in highways, bridges, mass transit, 
airports, and new construction as well as deferred maintenance for universities and community 
colleges and other state agencies like the Illinois Department of Natural Resources, the 
Department of Corrections, and Veterans Affairs.  
Added to that laundry list of new projects and new programs as well as new taxes to pay 
for those was the Governor’s signature proposal for a graduated income tax, on which he ran a 
very spirited 2018 campaign. This was the proposal to have the legislature approve his new 
graduated income tax referendum and then send it to the people via a constitutional referendum 
question to be put on the ballot in the fall of 2020 election.  A separate bill also contained the 
recommended tax brackets for each income group, which was hugely controversial and attracted 
tons of media attention.  That bill passed with only minor tweaking, with only Democratic votes 
in the House and Senate, as the Republicans were unanimously opposed. 
All in all, this was an extraordinary legislative year.  Veteran observers emphasized that 
any one or two these agenda items would have been considered major accomplishments by 
previous standards.  The whole package, some passed with significant input from Republican 
legislators and their constituent groups, meant that some bi-partisanship, at least under the right 
circumstances, including considerable involvement in the negotiations by the governor and his 
staff, could at times overcome years of bad blood and legislative gridlock (Miller, June 2, June 3, 
and June 10, 2019, A-11; Nowicki, June 4, 2019, 5).  The round-up of General Assembly action 
at the end of the session was summarized in the following words by the State Universities 
Annuitants Association (SUAA) report: 
“Love it or dislike it, the 101st General Assembly, with the assistance of Governor 
Pritzker, made significant changes in how business is done in the State of Illinois.  If anyone had 
the fortitude to listen to the last several days of the session, you would have noted the change of 
attitudes at the end.  Progress actually does materialize when people can negotiate, have the 
freedom to ask questions, and have the courtesy to listen to each other.  Maybe it did help that 
there were over 50 new freshmen legislators who came with new ideas, convictions, and 
aspirations.  And, the importance of a Governor who took charge by working with legislators to 
forge through issues that had been held up for years” (SUAA, June 3, 2019, 1).   
Jim Durkin, the Republican leader in the House of Representatives issued a press release 
summarizing the just concluded legislative session as follows: 
“The end of the legislative session was another historic moment for House Republicans.  
Not only did we pass a bipartisan, balanced budget without any tax increases, but we also 
achieved significant business reforms for our communities that will boost the economy across 
our state.  As I’ve said before, we can get great things done for Illinois families as long as we 
respect the principles and priorities of each caucus.  In doing so, we have passed historic 
education reform, two bipartisan, balanced budgets and now important reforms that will grow 
jobs.  I am proud to have worked with the legislative leaders and the Governor to finally do what 
is right for Illinois families and business” (Miller, June 4, 2019).   
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The respected center-right British journal, The Economist, in an article titled, “Illinois’s 
Political System Seems to Work After All”, provided this summary of the just concluded 
session:  
            “The new governor, J. B. Pritzker, a Democrat, is enjoying balmy times.  He has super-
majorities in the legislature and also gets bipartisan support when Republicans like at least some 
measures.  He has signed off on a $40bn budget that sailed through the legislature.  It is even 
balanced, something so rare that Mr. Pritzker’s Ukrainian ancestors might have likened it to a 
crayfish whistling on a mountain” (Economist, June 22, 2019, 22).  
At the beginning of the year Pritzker was just coming off a personal victory in the 
governor’s race by a wide margin.  As a result of those same fall elections the Democrats had a 
supermajority in both houses of the legislature and complete control of state government, and it 
was clear that the onus was on them to produce.  The Democrats maintained that is exactly what 
they did as they accepted the challenge of trying to govern, whether one believed in the 
substance of their legislation and the overall direction they were taking the state or not. 
Public opinion and the views of the electorate will play an important role in the future of 
the Pritzker administration’s plans and programs and the fate of the Democratic majorities in the 
House and Senate.  Our polls have consistently shown that some of the major components of the 
Pritzker program are popular at this point—the progressive income tax, the “millionaire’s tax”, 
expanding gambling, and legalizing recreational marijuana, for example. Others, such as the 
increase in the motor fuel tax, are highly unpopular now and have been in all of our polls.  We 
will soon see how that dichotomy and dialectic plays out in the reaction of the mass public, the 
political leaders, interest groups, the media, and opinion leaders, to Pritzker’s high-profile 
version of his first “one hundred days plus” in the governor’s office.   
There are two possible scenarios for the next two to four years.  One is that the 
extraordinary range and scope of new legislation passed, and the new sources of revenue tapped 
to pay for it all will create an immediate and harsh backlash.  As explained earlier, nationally the 
advent and rise of the Tea Party in 2009 and 2010 gave voice to the populist backlash against the 
drastic steps taken by the Bush Administration first, and then the Obama Administration to 
manage and limit the damage to the 2008-2009 financial system breakdown.  They accomplished 
this through an unprecedented federal government bail-out of major banks, insurance companies 
and the automobile industry, and they added a massive stimulus package to get the moribund 
economy running again and to pull the nation out of the Great Recession.  The Tea Party has 
been especially influential in our national politics ever since and gained new clout when the 
Trump Administration came into office. They and their allies in the Congress, under the name of 
The Freedom Caucus, teamed up with the White House, have proved conclusively that the 
American public likes tax cuts a lot more than they like tax increases.  That truism could be 
seized upon at the state level in Illinois by a well-financed and highly motivated coalition of 
interest groups, partisan media, and conservative and Republican leaders if they want to 
make the recent tax increases a rallying cry for mobilizing a populist backlash in Illinois in 
the 2020 elections.   
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Alternatively, Pritzker, his administration and his Democratic allies in the General 
Assembly may be able to make a positive case: that the programs and projects were sorely 
needed after a decade’s worth of stringent budgets had left the state’s public services and 
executive branch agencies hollowed out, and that the financial means for revitalizing Illinois 
government could only be provided by significant revenue increases.  This narrative would 
require an articulate, persuasive, and well-funded public campaign for the kind of positive 
government that Pritzker clearly supports.  The campaigns, for and against the progressive 
income tax, will probably be the driving vehicle for this dialogue to take place between now and 
November of 2020. 
7 CONCLUSION  
The moral of this story is that governing matters; getting results and producing the goods 
and services that the people expect and depend on matters.  It matters to the lives of all the 
people of Illinois as they depend on all governments, but particularly state government for 
the myriad of services they require each day.   
Many Americans do not even think about the multitude of governmental services and the 
complex web of governmental units and jurisdictions they must have just to get their children to 
school and get to work and then back home each day. 
Routine pattern maintenance is necessary in our daily lives as we encounter ubiquitous 
government in ways that are usually unseen and thus out of mind.  Our culture of “rugged 
individualism” leads us to believe that we do it all, or mostly, by and for ourselves.  We alone 
created the company; we made a success of our education or our careers, and steered our 
children with good parental guidance.  It is a deeply engrained part of the American political 
culture to believe that the government just gets in the way and curtails our liberties.  Our civic 
educations have failed to include a sufficient grounding in the very real ways in which the 
government “provides for the common defense and promotes the general welfare” as well as 
“domestic tranquility,” let alone protection from “all enemies domestic and foreign” in the words 
of the Constitution. Citizens ignore how much ensuring those public goods, these essential 
functions depends on constant governmental assistance and presence in our daily lives.  
Public goods are the things that we the people, working together as a community, or collectively 
can provide more effectively, more efficiently, and more equitably than the private market can or 
will provide because they must make a profit.  These basic functions constitute the roll call of 
public goods that living in a community requires in the 21st Century.  We only notice them when 
they disappear in the midst of natural disasters such as floods, wild fires, hurricanes, and 
tornados, or in dangerous periods of civil unrest, mass shootings, domestic terrorism, or attacks 
by a hostile power. Then we want all levels of government to show up and to provide help, now.     
 State and local governments are the crucial cogs in that governmental machinery, especially in 
making and executing domestic policy and providing for the everyday functions of community 
life where we live.  But the absence of government, particularly in the fairly frequent 
“governmental shut downs” of the federal government, most recently in December of 2018 and 
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January of 2019 for an unprecedented 35 days, showed graphically what many people had not 
realized before: that they depended on and had to have certain essential services, which were 
threatened or curtailed by the shut-down. 
Illinois ran the same social and political experiment in 2016 and 2017 with its prolonged 
legislative gridlock, producing a record failure of its basic constitutional duty to adopt a budget.  
The dislocations were massive and lasting and the state will have enough recuperation to do to 
last at least the next decade.  Whether we have started that recuperation is the question we pose 
in the “Gridlock Broken?” subtitle of this paper.   
Our polls for over a decade have demonstrated that most people in general do not like taxes, and 
they certainly do not gladly contemplate increasing their own taxes.  At the same time, our polls 
have also demonstrated consistently that, when presented with a specific list of major programs 
that state taxes are devoted to funding, Illinois voters do not support big budget cuts.  It is all too 
easy and usually popular for candidates to run against the government in general and taxes in 
particular in their campaigns, and they often get elected partially by railing against taxes and 
“waste and fraud” in government.  Then when they are in office they frequently want new 
projects and new spending in their districts, and the re-opening of old facilities or programs that 
have closed. Ribbon cutting ceremonies are popular and happy occasions for public officials at 
the state and local levels, and they like to show up when the capital budget supports new 
facilities or major renovations of older ones.  
We the voters want to have our cake and eat it too, or in this case have our services and programs 
and let someone else, including our children and grandchildren, pay for them. This self-
contradictory approach to public finance has dominated our political culture and discourse for 
generations. Our elected officials have often given the voters what they say they wanted by 
rewarding them with our votes. The Simon Polls, reported in the first edition of this paper and 
several earlier papers and press releases, have consistently documented the parameters of this 
paradoxical equation.  
This case study succinctly illustrates a classic thesis about the nature of public opinion in the 
United States. More than fifty years ago, the scholars Lloyd Free and Hadley Cantril called the 
American people “symbolic conservatives” and “operational liberals,” to reflect the blatantly 
inconsistent impulses in the American political culture (Free and Cantril, 1967).  That synopsis 
cogently captures the views of the voters of Illinois and their contradictory views opposing taxes 
while supporting a wide range of public services and programs as reflected in the Simon Polls for 
the last twelve years.   
 This is why it is so difficult to pay down the backlog of bills that Illinois has accumulated over 
the almost two decades since the start of the 21st century.  Not surprisingly, then, it has been 
even more difficult for any recent Illinois governor to devise a realistic plan to address the 
unfunded liability embedded in the Illinois public pension system which is an even more abstract 
idea for most people.  The last governor to even make a serious attempt to solve this problem 
was Jim Edgar in the 1990s.  While he and his administration and the General Assembly of that 
era did make some progress, they also left Illinois’ pension system with the “ramp,” or “balloon 
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payment” to be paid in the then-distant future of the 21st Century.  It was just easier and more 
politically prudent to pass the problems off to future governors and future General Assemblies.   
  Returning to the theoretical and conceptual setting established at the outset of this paper, 
the current conditions of unified government basically fulfill the requirements for the peculiarly 
American brand of Responsible Parties and Conditional Party Government we defined earlier: 
The legislature and the governor’s office are controlled by the same party, and the governor ran 
on a clear and well-articulated platform, which he and his allies in the General Assembly then 
proceeded to try to enact into policy. The gridlock of the previous governor, struggling under 
divided government, and the absence of a budget for two long years was the backdrop of our 
2016 paper where we documented and analyzed “the Roots of Gridlock,” that paper’s subtitle. 
We will see if our somewhat more hopeful subtitle of “Gridlock Broken?” will be warranted by 
subsequent political events and will be evident in the voters’ opinions in our future polling. 
It will now be up the governor and the Democrats in the General Assembly, to explain 
and defend the advantages of the policies they have produced and to show that they are working 
for the benefit of a majority of the people.  This is another key requirement of the Responsible 
Parties model.  This explanation and defense of the laws passed and actions taken has already 
started. It will intensify early in 2020 when the mid-term legislative elections will start to take 
shape, especially with the Illinois Primary in March.  Soon after that campaign ends on 
November 3, 2020, the 2022 election for governor and the other state constitutional offices will 
begin, and Pritzker’s leadership will be on the line as well as the jobs of a lot of Democratic 
office holders.  This is a form of accountability that is required under the Responsible Parties 
model, and in a larger sense it is a key element of electoral democracy itself.  
There will be plenty of opportunities for legislative gridlock to begin again or to deepen, 
particularly if the Republicans make major gains in the 2020 midterms (as for example, the GOP 
did in the Congress in the mid-terms of 2010 and 2014).  If they do, then Pritzker and his allies in 
the General Assembly will bear the blame and will have to accept the judgment of the voters at 
the ballot box and in the legislative process. However, for now at least, it appears that the long 
siege of legislative gridlock has broken up amid the major accomplishments of the recently 
concluded General Assembly working with the governor and with some bipartisanship 
agreement.   
At the Paul Simon Public Policy Institute, our polls show that in some issue areas we are 
sometimes winning, or at least gaining ground, in the battle for rational, fact based and 
responsible decision-making. But they also sometimes show that reason is not prospering, and 
rational analysis is losing ground in other areas.  That is why the longitudinal data in this paper, 
the results of twelve years of statewide polling, is an important stock-taking report on the climate 
of opinion for our state during the turbulent and historic times Illinois has faced as it has just 
passed its 200th birthday and entered into the third century of its storied history.   
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APPENDIX A: DATA NOTES 
Year Sample Size Margin of Error 
2008 561 +/-4.1 
2009 800 +/-3.5 
2010 1,000 +/-3.1 
2011 1,000 +/-3.1 
2012 1,261 +/-2.8 
2013 600 +/-4.0 
2014a 1,001 +/-3.1 
2014b 1,006 +/-3.1 
2015 1,000 +/-3.1 
2016a 1,000 +/-3.1 
2016b           1,000                +/-3.1 
2017 1,000 +/-3.1 
2018a 1,001 +/-3.1 
2018b           1,000                +/-3.1 
2019 1,000 +/-3.1 
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